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ABSTRACT 
 
Background: The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, (CMS) implements 
National Coverage Decisions (NCD) to expand access or eliminate regional reimbursement 
differences. Policymakers may estimate clinical and economic consequences through short 
term pilots or demonstration projects. 
Objective: Examined whether short term outcomes mirror longer term outcomes for a 
CMS NCD for Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) in Parkinson‘s Disease (PD).  
Methods: This observational study examined the inpatient clinical and economic 
outcomes associated with a CMS NCD for DBS in PD using Health Care Utilization Project 
(HCUP) retrospective data from 1999 through 2007. The Healthcare Utilization Project 
(HCUP) data, is supported by CMS. HCUP is the largest collection of all-payer, uniform, 
state-based inpatient surgery administrative data and covers the years of interest. Short-term 
cross-sectional analysis examined 12 months pre NCD (January 1, 1999 to March 31, 2003); 
and 12 months post NCD (April 1, 2003 to March 30, 2004). Long–term, cross-sectional 
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analysis examined the three years, three months prior to the the short term pre period 
(January 1, 1999 to March 31, 2002); and the three years, nine months after the short term 
post period (April 1 2004 to December 31, 2007).  
Results: A patient who had DBS surgery in the 12 months post NCD is more likely to 
be discharged to long or short term care rather than home (OR 3.671, p=0.0249); is 
associated with longer lengths of stay (0.2888, p=0.0001); and is positively associated with 
the log of total charges (0.19985, p=0.0240).  A patient who has DBS surgery more than 12 
months post NCD compared surgery more than 12 months pre NCD, was less likely to have 
complications (OR 0.376, 0.0004) , was associated with a shorter length of stay (-0.2857, 
p=0.0093), and is positively associated with the log of total charges (0.33875, p<0.001). 
Conclusions: These results suggest that after the benefit expansion, outcomes 
worsened in the short term, and improved in the long term.  Policymakers may benefit from a 
longer term view when forecasting before--or interpreting outcomes after--a benefit design 
change.  Differences in populations served may cause temporary or long term shifts in health 
outcomes and resource utilization. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Introduction 
 
Medicare was enacted in 1965 through an amendment to the Social Security Act 
(SSA). This amendment established the Medicare program; defined individuals eligible for 
services and defined broad categories of health care services to be funded. The amendment 
also outlined the process by which subcategories of clinical services would be evaluated for 
funding. This progress is known as the National Coverage Determination (NCD).   
While the NCD process has evolved since its inception, the guiding principles of the 
original process remain intact. First, a request for a new NCD can be make by any individual 
or other party. Second, all coverage decisions will be made only after through deliberation of 
the all scientific, clinical and economic evidence supporting the requested technology. In 
instances where the body of evidence is not sufficient, Medicare may fund pilot programs to 
gather additional evidence to inform the coverage determination. After review of the 
evidence, Medicare will make the decision either to cover the technology or not. Such 
coverage decisions, however, are not easy given the mandate of Medicare to ensure adequate 
deliberation while balancing conflicting goals so inherent in health care decision making: 
cost, access, quality, service delivery models, financing and payment (CMS Application 
Guidelines, 2009).   
When funding is available, implementation of the NCD requires the agency to define 
the targeted patient population through specific inclusion/exclusion criteria and standardize 
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insurance coding to facilitate reimbursement. Ensuring transparency in the process is a top 
priority for Medicare and public comment is welcome at multiple steps in the process.  After 
implementation, Medicare may monitor and report the outcomes of national coverage 
decisions specific to changes in access, cost and quality. At other times, however, such data 
are not available.  
 
Problem Statement 
 
The purpose of the current evaluation is to address one gap in the literature specific to 
the impact of a NCD change that occurred in 2003—Medicare‘s decision to fund deep brain 
stimulation (DBS) in patients with advanced Parkinson‘s disease.  The evaluation reported 
below focused on short and long term changes in access, cost and quality for patients 
undergoing deep brain stimulation. The short term analysis compares 12 months prior to the 
NDC vis-à-vis 12 months after the decision. The longer term compared the three years, three 
months prior the short term to the three years, nine months after the short term. Both the 
short and long term analysis will investigate if the NCD was a key determinant of (1) the 
number of patients receiving DBS; (2) patient characteristics before and after NCD; (3) 
changes in provision of DBS by both hospital and physicians; and (4) changes in patient 
outcomes. The outcomes reported below provide data to support future decision making by 
multiple stakeholders in both the public and private arena. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
 
 Medicare started in 1965 after much debate and political wrangling. Central to the 
debate surrounding the implementation of Medicare was the fundamental question over who 
should receive coverage. Some believed that government benefits should be means tested and 
delivered only to the needy. Others believed that funding of public assistance should be the 
responsibility of individuals in all socioeconomic brackets. At the end of the debate, 
Medicare evolved through a compromise of all perspectives. First, all entities agreed that the 
elderly were deserving of federally funded health insurance. Second, those worried about 
wealth transfer were assuaged by two features of Medicare: payroll taxes on all workers 
would fund the program; and everyone, rich and poor, had the promise of their own Medicare 
entitlement in old age (Marmor, 2003, pp. 10-11). 
 Since 1965, the breadth of Medicare coverage has expanded incrementally with 
funding occurring through the Part A and Part B programs. More substantive change has 
been enacted in the past few years. In 2003, a prescription drug benefit passed in the 
Medicare Modernization Act (Part D) with implementation of the program beginning in 
2006. With this change, Medicare now covers inpatient care, outpatient care, some aspects of 
home health, and prescription drugs. Further expansion is proposed to occur in the future. 
The Patient Protection and Affordability Act passed in March of 2010 is designed to cover an 
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additional 40 Million uninsured Americans beginning in 2014 (The Patient Protection and 
Affordability Act, 2010). 
Parallel to these extensive Medicare benefit expansions, citizens and policymakers 
have cautioned that the unrestrained growth of benefits would lead to insolvency. For 
example, less than four months after the prescription drug program was enacted, a report 
forecasting Medicare insolvency by 2019 appeared in the press (Pear, 2004, pp. 1-3).  
Several initiatives to respond to the concern of insolvency have been proposed. One 
option gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services more regulatory authority to 
implement needed change as budgetary constraints relax or tighten. The recently passed 
Patient Protection and Affordability Act provide a number of areas of discretion for the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services. Such discretion is embodied in language included 
in the act such as ―the Secretary shall…‖:  
―develop standards…;‖ (p. 14) 
―review and update, as appropriate, the standards developed in this section…;‖ (p.14) 
―establish a formula for determining the amount of any grant to a State…;‖ (p. 22) 
―establish a temporary high risk health insurance pool program…;‖ (p. 23) 
―negotiate rates for the reimbursement of health care providers for benefits covered 
under a community health insurance option…;‖ (p. 76) 
―prescribe rules setting forth the methods by which calculations of family size and 
household income…;‖ (p. 100) 
―Secretary shall identify and publish a recommended core set of adult health quality 
measures…;‖ (p. 199) 
(Patient Protection and Reimbursement Act, 2010) 
 
 
 Other initiatives focus on generation of new data to guide medical decision making 
by both public and private entities. In 2009, the American Recovery and Reimbursement Act 
allocated $1.1 billion dollars to comparative effectiveness research that would reveal the best 
interventions in various therapeutic areas. In the Patient Protection and Affordability Act, the 
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Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute was created to evaluate which interventions, 
patient education programs, and integrated service models worked the best in various disease 
states. Although these results are not intended to influence Medicare‘s reimbursement 
decisions, the private companies that Medicare contracts with to provide care can use these 
research results, as well as their own, to make reimbursement decisions.  
Alternative reimbursement strategies to align payment with quality outcomes have 
also been considered by Medicare. Some evidence supports a correlation between the number 
of procedures performed by a clinician and the outcome. This literature, frequently known as 
the volume effect literature, has demonstrated that surgeons and/or hospitals with less 
experience in a given procedure are more likely to have worse patient outcomes (Chernow, 
1999; Eiseman, 1965; Eskander, Flaherty, Cosgrove, Shinobu & Barker, 2003; Halm & 
Chassin, 2002; Heidenreich & McClellan, 2001; Kim, Song, Lee, Han, Hyung & Cho, 2008). 
The final options available to Medicare are very politically charges. Such initiatives 
support either (1) raising taxes; (2) means testing; (3) reducing the number of beneficiaries 
served by Medicare or (4) reducing the number and types of services each beneficiary 
receives. National Coverage Determinations guide the number and type of services available 
to Medicare beneficiaries. Denying needed services to patients does little to help the 
Medicare agenda of advancing access and quality even though it does assist with budget 
considerations. The research present below evaluates whether the 2003 NCD for DBS in 
patients with Parkinson‘s Disease (PD) achieves the health care goals of Medicare.  In the 
literature, there are no studies assessing the clinical and economic outcomes of Parkinson‘s 
patients who undergo surgery for deep brain stimulation before and after the National 
Coverage Decision (NCD) by Medicare in 2003.  Evaluation of this change in coverage 
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decisions is important for several reasons: (1) access; (2) concerns related to cost given the 
aging of the United States population and inherent increases in the incidence and prevalence 
of Parkinson‘s Disease as Medicare beneficiaries; and (3) patient outcomes. 
 
Policy Analysis and Program Evaluation:  Models and Theory 
 
Policy analysis and program evaluation for Medicare has concentrated on a number of 
models. Sometimes a timeline is used to reveal the incremental nature of expansion as 
described above. Other times, organizational, administrative, or economic theories or models 
are used to explain the public policy of Medicare. 
 Marmor describes the origins of Medicare as a less controversial initiative than 
national health insurance. Marmor posits that Truman chose this approach because he 
concluded that insurance for the aged had the best chance of getting passed because the 
public would not object to a program for the elderly. This view of the government as a 
rational actor assumes that some purposeful description of the issues at hand takes place, that 
explanations of those issues and their consequences are proposed, and that policy outcomes 
are then predicted and measured over time (Marmor, 1970/1973/2003). 
 One limitation of this approach is that it focuses on the political imperatives in place 
at the time a strategy is taken, and does not consider the possible intransigence of the 
circumstances that form those imperatives. For example, if the political imperatives were a 
result of an unstable or narrow majority in Congress, more thought might be given to how the 
political imperatives might change with the next election.  
 From an organizational perspective, however, one would spend less time 
understanding why choices were made in a rational fashion and more time trying to 
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understand the pattern of decision-making. That is, how did concerned lobbying groups 
shape the discussion regardless of the policy issue at hand. Marmor contends that this model 
is more attuned to the behavior of the polar camps comprised of the American Medical 
Association (opposed to Medicare) and the AFL-CIO (supported Medicare) because it was 
the needs of these two organizations that shaped the debate and the ideological positions each 
had on social insurance initiatives (Marmor, 1970/1973/2003). 
 While this approach addresses the limitation of the rational actor model, it seems too 
simplistic to explain today‘s state of Medicare. True, Congress may be polarized at times 
with opposing views of health care reform. This situation, however, will most likely not be 
changing in the near term. Even in the presence of divisive political discourse about 
Medicare, two Presidents have expanded Medicare in unprecedented ways over the last seven 
years through the passage of the Medicare Modernization Act and the Patient Protection and 
Affordability Act. Neither the rational actor model nor the organizational process model 
seems particularly useful in describing recent events. 
 In a bureaucratic politics model, Medicare policy would be viewed as the outcome of 
bargaining between actors in decentralized organizations. In this approach, the policy 
outcome is not the solution to a pressing social problem, but rather the result of the 
bargaining between organizations with varying power. Predicting the future policy would 
include efforts to keep the power of the bargaining parties the same and would not, for 
example, include periodic discussions about whether new, additional social needs had arisen 
that need attention (Marmor, 1970/1973/2003). 
 It seems that this model would include internal bureaucratic bargaining over 
discretionary powers of government agencies. As such, it might include the perspective of 
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Richard Nixon when, after failed attempts at change through legislative victory, turned to 
influencing change by controlling the administrative branch. Nixon concluded, ‗operations is 
policy,‘ (Randall, 1979, p. 808). The recent large expansions in Medicare have included 
many areas for discretion in implementation. And, in fact, the research outlined below in 
benefit expansion policy evaluation focuses on applied measurement of the outcomes of a 
discretionary expansion in Medicare benefits. This model is appropriate for the given 
research hypothesis and lends itself to empirical testing. 
 Jonathan Oberlander (2003) contends that no one institutional theory can explain 
Medicare‘s political existence. Instead, Oberlander recommends assessing the actual 
experience of Medicare, rather than trying to model it with any single framework. Oberlander 
asserts that the politics of Medicare from 1965 to 1994 was one of consensus as evidenced by 
bipartisan support for hospital and physician payment reforms; and a general recognition that 
healthcare for those over 65 years of age should be operated as a single payer system. 
Oberlander summarizes by pointing out that Medicare is again in an era with a discussion 
about ideas, and not just solvency. 
 Oberlander‘s acceptance of multiple theories is appealing; however, his explanation 
of sequential uses for these models implies that multiple models are not appropriate 
simultaneously. Medicare is a large organization with many pieces: administrative discretion, 
Congressional oversight, interaction with a privatized healthcare delivery system, and the 
discerning eyes of entitled beneficiaries. This complex organization may need more than one 
theory to fully understand. Further, this complexity may lend credence to Oberlander‘s 
suggestion that the actual experience of Medicare be examined rather than predicted or 
explained by theory. 
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From the economist‘s perspective, the DBS benefit expansion may be evaluated 
against the Medicare goal of improved access to this surgery as measured by the utilization 
of the procedure before and after the NCD. Conceptually, the coverage decision reduced the 
price of surgery to patients who were previously uncovered by insurance. At the same time, 
increase in reimbursement to physicians may encourage more utilization of the procedure in 
the targeted patient population. Through the traditional supply-demand model one would 
predict that there would be an increase in the quantity demanded for surgery because the 
price to the patient would be reduced (Nicholson & Snyder, 2005). A fundamental tenet of 
this model assumes that all players have perfect information which may not be true in the 
case of DBS in patients with advanced PD. It would be inherent, in most cases, that the 
physician would need to provide the information that the patient needs to form a rationale 
decision. If reimbursement increases, more physicians may be inclined to provide such 
information and encourage utilization of the procedure. Economists may suggest that changes 
in the NCD provide the ideal scenario for supplier-induced-demand implications. The 
potential for supplier-induced-demand is limited by the strict inclusion/exclusion criteria that 
exist for patient selection and funding. With the precertification of procedures that exists in 
health care markets, it is unlikely that patients who do not meet the strict inclusion/exclusion 
criteria will be admitted for the procedure. As such, the inclusion/exclusion constraint as well 
as the precertification process may reduce the physician ability to supply the procedure.  
Jones (1996) asserts that Medicare influences private insurance markets.  Medicare‘s 
coverage and administration ―…has helped fund a large tertiary care and teaching 
establishment, an expansion of hospital beds, an increase in the number of physicians 
(especially specialists) and health professionals, the growth of the for-profit sector, and a 
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burgeoning home health and independent laboratory industry. As noted previously, the 
constraints placed upon patient selection for DBS may limit its utilization. 
 Edward Lawler, in his book entitled, Redesigning the Medicare Contract: Politics, 
Markets, and Agency, applies agency theory to Medicare to illustrate nature of inter-
relationships between enrollees, doctors, hospitals, administrators and Congress. Lawler 
defines agency in this way:  
In a simple agency relationship between a single principal and 
an agent, an individual or organization is delegated to act on 
behalf of the principal. An agent is supposed to do what the 
principal wants to have done. A perfect agent performs exactly 
as if the principal were acting, except that the principal does 
not have sufficient information, time, or other capabilities to 
perform the service in question (2003, p. 56).  
 Consider the doctor-patient relationship: the patient is the principal and the doctor is 
the agent. The patient hires, or contracts, the doctor to make decisions that the patient herself 
would make if she had the knowledge to make them herself. But physicians today also serve 
as agents for equity partnerships. Sometimes the incentives, or contracts, used by these firms 
encourage behavior that is contradictory to the best interests of the patient. For example, the 
physician may have caps on the number of tests he or she can order. Exceeding these caps 
may have a negative impact on the physician‘s income but also may be in the best interest of 
the patient. In other words, to be a perfect agent for the patient, the physician may sub-
optimally serve as agent for the equity partnership; and to be a perfect agent for the equity 
partnership, the physician may sub-optimally treat his other agent, the patient. (Lawler, 
2003). 
Lawler meets his objective of explaining how agency theory can help Medicare 
policy analysis by exploring the array of contracts involved in delivery of care. Layered in 
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these contracts between the patients, physicians, claims administrators and private firms 
(durable medical equipment manufacturers, medical device manufacturers, etc.) are 
contradictory or competing incentives that influence behavior. The web of double-agents is 
complex understanding these complexities can help policymakers to understand how ongoing 
changes to Medicare may improve one aspect of care delivery, but create an unintended 
incentive for something that detracts from other aspects of Medicare. 
In its application to Medicare, Agency theory may have more value as a heuristic 
device than as a basis for applied measurement. Teasing out what consequences are due to a 
physician optimizing their behavior for one principal over another would be extremely 
challenging empirically. 
 
Costs and Effectiveness in Medicare 
  
The ongoing concerns about the fiscal health of Medicare have matured from 
warnings about insolvency to a commitment to measuring costs and outcomes of care. The 
Medicare Modernization Act, which sets forth the Part D benefit for prescription drugs, 
recognizes the role of this research. The following sections of the Medicare Modernization 
Act (2003) specifically recommend or require cost effectiveness research on delivered health 
care: 
1. Sec. 1860D-4 (B) Formulary Development. In developing and 
reviewing the formulary, the committee shall—(i) base clinical 
decisions on the strength of scientific evidence and standards of 
practice, including assessing peer-reviewed medical literature, such as 
randomized clinical trials, pharmacoeconomic studies, outcomes 
research data, and on such other information as the committee 
determines to be appropriate; (p. 20) 
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2. Sec. 1860D-4 (C) Cost and Utilization Management; Quality 
Assurance; Medication Therapy Management Program—(1) In general 
the PDP [Prescription Drug Plan] sponsor shall have in place, directly 
or through appropriate arrangements, with respect to covered part D 
drugs, the following: (A) A cost-effective drug utilization management 
program, including incentives to reduce costs when medically 
appropriate, such as through the use of multiple source drugs (as 
defined in section 1927(k)(u)(A)(k)). (p. 20) 
 
3. Sec. 641. Demonstration Project for Coverage of Certain Prescription 
Drugs and Biologicals. (e) Report—Not later than July 1, 2006, the 
Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the project. The report 
shall include an evaluation of patient access to care and patient 
outcomes under the project, as well as an analysis of the cost 
effectiveness of the project, including an evaluation of the costs 
savings (if any) to the medicare program attributable to the reduced 
physicians’ services and hospital outpatient departments services for 
administration of the biological.  
(p. 256 [emphasis mine]) 
 
This statutory recognition of the need for cost-effectiveness research reveals that in 
the future, Medicare reimbursement decisions may increasingly depend on the economic 
performance of an intervention. Economic evaluations of health care delivery in Medicare fit 
into two broad categories. The first is programmatic; that is, examinations of the performance 
of the entire program as a whole. The second is disease or treatment specific; that is, the 
performance evaluation of an individual condition or the intervention for that condition. 
Numerous evaluations have been published in the literature that supports both types of 
studies.  
 Foote and coauthors have contributed to the literature a number of scholarly articles 
that examine programmatic features of the delivery of care in Medicare. For example, Foote 
examined: the politics of preventative care in Medicare (Foote & Blewett, 2003); the 
implications of a new initiative to care for the chronically ill (Foote, 2006); the variation in 
coverage policies by geographic location (Foote, Wholey, Rockwood, & Halpern, 2004; 
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Foote; Halpern & Wholey, 2005) and the consequences of Medicare modernization reform 
(Foote & Neumann, 2005). 
 Others examined Medicare from other perspectives: the consequences of longevity in 
Medicare (Miller, 2001); decision theory and Medicare coverage choices (Hanoch & Rice, 
2006); pricing transparency (DoBias, 2006); and the effect of prospective payment on 
staffing and quality of care in skilled nursing facilities (White, 2005, 2006). 
 The former head administrator for CMS, Mark McClellan, has published widely both 
on programmatic themes and individual disease states. On programmatic topics, McClellan 
has published on Medicare reform (McClellan, 2000); Medicare Part D (McClellan, 2005; 
Bach & McClellan, 2005); and Medicare abuse, (Becker, Kessler, & McClellan, 2005). On 
treatment or disease specific topics, McClellan has published on: treatment trends for 
Medicare beneficiaries with ventricular arrhythmias (McDonald, et al, 2002); device use 
patterns and outcomes for cardioverter defibrillators for Medicare beneficiaries in California 
(Hlatky, Saynina, McDonald, Garber, & McClellan, 2002); costs associated with decedents 
in Medicare (Buntin, McClellan & Newhouse, 2004); trends in treatment and outcomes for 
myocardial infarction (Heidenreich & McClellan, 2001); and trends in inpatient treatment 
intensity for Medicare beneficiaries near death (Barnato, McClellan, Kagay, & Garber, 
2004). 
 Others have explored diseases and interventions such as: the cost of smoking to 
Medicare (Zhang, Miller, Max, & Rice, 1999); the cost of colon resections (Sung, Wessel, 
Gallagher, Marcet & Murr, 2004); the reimbursement structure and its effect on 
chemotherapy treatment (Jacobson, et al, 2006); the cost of Alzheimer‘s patients to Medicare 
(Taylor & Sloan, 2000);the cost of kidney transplants (Yen, et al, 2004); and the cost of 
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defibrillators (Weiss, Saynina, McDonald, McClellan, & Hlatky, 2002). Finally, Katia Noyes 
and coauthors examined the costs associated with Parkinson‘s disease in elderly Medicare 
beneficiaries (Noyes, Liu, Li, Holloway, & Dick, 2006).  
 Specific to the purposes of this dissertation, in 2003 Medicare added reimbursement 
for the surgery and the device for deep brain stimulation (DBS) for advanced Parkinson‘s 
disease. Although regionally available prior to this time, a national coverage decision meant 
that this procedure would be covered in all regions. The DBS device, like other devices in 
development, is being studied for use in many other conditions--some of which are very 
common. DBS may be effective in treating depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
chronic pain, epilepsy and multiple sclerosis (The Cleveland Clinic Health Information 
Center, 2001). The ability to assess the clinical and economic outcomes for DBS in 
Parkinson‘s disease is representative of the type of evaluation Medicare administrators will 
need to implement for other devices and biologics as they are approved. 
In the literature, there are no studies assessing the clinical and economic 
outcomes of Parkinson‘s patients who undergo surgery for deep brain stimulation 
before and after the National Coverage Decision (NCD) by Medicare in 2003.  
Evaluation for this implantable device in Medicare is important for three reasons: (1) 
to learn whether reimbursement for this surgery and device improves access to the 
procedure; (2) to prepare for the aging of the population and the attendant increased 
prevalence of Parkinson‘s disease in the Medicare population; and (3) the device used 
in this surgery is being developed for more diseases and therefore the true burden on 
the Medicare budget will be many-fold the burden represented by Parkinson‘s 
disease.  
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Deep Brain Stimulation in Parkinson’s Disease 
 
 Parkinson‘s disease is a progressive neurological disease affecting mostly older 
individuals. The burden of Parkinson‘s disease includes loss of independence and function 
for the patient, caregiving responsibilities on the part of spouses and children, the expense of 
walking aids and modifications to living quarters, and for some, use of long term care 
facilities. One recent study places the annual incremental direct and indirect costs of 
Parkinson‘s disease to society in the United States at $23 billion and this figure is expected to 
grow to at least $50 billion by the year 2040 (Huse, et al, 2005). Additionally, with the baby 
boomer cohort entering the years of typical diagnosis, the number of people with Parkinson‘s 
disease will grow at a rate faster than the growth of the general population (Lang & Lozano, 
1998). 
 Parkinson‘s disease is incurable. The treatments available for Parkinson‘s disease are 
symptomatic and do not prevent progression of the disease. Over time, doses of appropriate 
medicines must be increased and additional agents added to adequately control the tremor, 
rigidity and slowness of movement associated with Parkinson‘s disease. Unfortunately, the 
medicines themselves can have unpleasant side effects including daytime sleepiness, nausea, 
hallucinations, and excessive gambling (Huse, Castelli-Haley, Orsini, Lenhart, & Abdalla, 
2006). For some in the advanced stages of Parkinson‘s disease, there are unpredictable 
periods of poor mobility. Patients in this advanced stage of Parkinson‘s disease may be 
candidates for DBS surgery. 
 DBS surgery implants a wire in the brain connected to a small generator in the chest. 
When switched on with an external magnet by the patient, the wire stimulates the targeted 
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area of the brain and Parkinson‘s symptoms diminish or stop. If patients have symptoms on 
one side of the body, they have one wire; if they have symptoms on both sides of the body 
(e.g. tremor in both left and right extremities) they have wires on both sides of the brain. 
When the device is implanted, the patient is usually under local anesthetic and awake. During 
the surgery, the probe is moved different parts of the brain until the surgeon observes that the 
patient‘s symptoms decrease or disappear. At this time the probe is permanently placed 
(Parkinson‘s Disease Society Information Sheet, 2003).  
Although an expensive option, this surgical technique is effective for some 
Parkinson‘s patients. Randomized controlled trials are difficult to do with surgical 
interventions as they require a placebo surgery. However, in uncontrolled trials, DBS has 
reduced post-surgery doses of anti-Parkinson drugs (Charles, et al, 2004), and improved 
activities of daily living, mobility and other symptoms measured by the Unified Parkinson‘s 
Disease Rating Scale (Rodriguez-Oroz, et al, 2005). However, the device and procedure have 
risks as well. Although Parkinson‘s is a disease of the elderly, the device is not approved for 
implantation in patients 75 years of age or older.  In the registration clinical trials, 96.3% of 
enrolled patients experienced one or more adverse events including: intracranial hemorrhage, 
7.5%; device related infection, 10.6%; pain, 31.3%; confusion, 27.5%; abnormal thinking, 
20.6%; and hallucinations, 6.9% (Medtronic Activa® Therapy, 2006). 
Although costs for the DBS surgery can vary with lengths of stay in the hospital and 
adverse events, the manufacturer estimates procedure costs of $50,000 to $60,000. A number 
of studies examined the costs and effectiveness of DBS surgery in the United States, 
Germany, France and Italy. Economic and clinical outcomes are difficult to compare across 
countries and this difficulty is well documented: different cultural levels of stigma may 
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influence diagnosis and recorded prevalence rates (Vernooij-Dassen, et al, 2005); the 
structure of healthcare delivery including collaboration patterns between nurses and 
physicians may differ (Hojat, et al, 2001); the mean, skewness and spread of the data 
collected may differ (Thomson, Nixon & Grieve, 2006); the available treatments and prices 
for treatments differ by country (van Mosseveld, 2005; Ridley, 2005); the incidence of 
diseases may differ by country (Nowak, et al, 2005); and socioeconomic status may influence 
the incidence of complications in certain diseases (Walsh, Zgibor, Songer, Borch-Johnsen, & 
Orchard, 2005).  
Some of the DBS economic studies in the literature employ a set of research 
techniques that were developed in Canada and Europe to assist in allocating resources to 
health care services and/or to determine reimbursement for drugs and other interventions. 
Some of the assumptions underlying these techniques are inconsistent with neo-classical 
economics. A brief overview of the approaches and an explanation as to how these 
approaches may violate the assumptions of neo-classical economics is provided. 
The most commonly used approaches for European resource allocation and/or 
reimbursement decisions are: (1) Cost-Effectiveness Analysis; and (2) Cost-Utility Analysis. 
Cost-Effectiveness Analyses typically assign a monetary value to a number of outcomes such 
as life-years gained, points of blood pressure reduced, or disability days saved. Cost-Utility 
Analyses assigns monetary value to a single output: Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY‘s). 
It is the Cost-Utility Analysis that is based on an assumption that utility can be discretely 
measured—most frequently in healthcare described as a point on a continuum death at zero 
to the best possible health at 1 (Drummond, Sculpher, Torrance, O‘Brien, & Stoddard, 2007).  
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One criticism from modern economists is that utilities are a theoretical construct that 
cannot be measured, only ordered (Nicholson & Snyder, 2005). Another criticism is from 
Economics Nobel Prize winning economist Daniel Khaneman. In Cost-Utility Analysis, 
utilities or health state preferences are measured by asking either patients or the general 
population hypothetical questions about preferences between possible combinations of risks, 
side-effects and death. Khaneman‘s research shows that respondents cannot accurately 
predict how they would respond to hypothetical scenarios ―because affective forecasting is a 
task that people do not perform very well‖ (Khaneman, 2006, p. 65).  Despite these criticisms 
of QALY measurement errors, European nations continue to use this approach to make 
reimbursement decisions in healthcare. Interestingly, the recent Patient Protection and 
Affordability Act expressly forbids use of QALY‘s in Medicare reimbursement decisions; 
however, the pharmacy benefit providers that Medicare contracts with can and do require and 
consider QALY‘s in formulary placement. 
In Germany, Spottke and coauthors found that DBS surgery improved scores on the 
Unified Parkinson‘s Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS). A cost-effectiveness analysis comparing 
the DBS treatment to pharmacy treatment alone was performed. The incremental cost per 
unit decrease in the total score of the UPDRS compared to pharmacy treatment alone was 
€920 or about $940 in 2002 (Spottke, et al, 2002). Although this study had a 12-month 
follow up period, there were only 16 patients in the study and thus it is too small to be 
definitive or generalizable. 
Later, Meissner and co-authors measured total costs over three years in Germany.  
Meissner examined the year before surgery, the year of surgery and the year after surgery. 
Total costs included drugs, in-patient costs and outpatient costs. Meissner found that on 
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average, total costs for patients in the year before surgery were €15,991 (about $19,797); 
average total costs in the year of surgery were €21,082 (about $26,100); and average total 
costs were €7,223 (about $8,942) in the second year after surgery. Meissner concludes that 
beginning in the second year post surgery, patients are symptomatically improved and cost 
less to the health care system than they did prior to surgery (Meissner, et al, 2005). In a cost-
effectiveness analysis, the incremental cost of decreasing the UPDRS III score in surgery 
patients compared to patients treated with pharmacy alone. The incremental cost per point on 
the UPDRS III was about €979 which is consistent with the € 920 in the Spottke research 
(Meissner, et al, 2005). This study improves upon Spottke‘s work in that it covers three years 
of treatment and in that it has 46 patients. However, the sample size is still rather small. Still, 
the confirmation of Spottke‘s estimates and the trend of lower costs over time reveals the 
possibility that this expensive surgery may provide value over time.  
A Pre-Post design was employed by Fraix and co-authors (2006) in France. Fraix 
followed 95 Parkinson‘s patients who had DBS surgery. Costs were measured in the six 
months before surgery and the six months after surgery. Total direct medical costs before the 
surgery were €10,087 (about $12,492) and the total direct medical costs during the six 
months after surgery were €1,673 (about $2,072). The costs of the surgery itself were 
estimated to be €36,904 or about $45,702 (Fraix, et al, 2006). The decreases in costs after 
surgery are substantial. However, several limitations are important to consider: the costs 
associated with complications were not included nor were the costs of replacing the devices 
periodically.  Another limitation of this study is the lack of longer follow up. The device does 
not does not prevent progression of the disease. Over time, symptoms will worsen and the 
incremental savings over pre-surgery costs will diminish.  
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 In the United States, Tomaszewski and Holloway developed a cost-utility Markov 
model that estimates the cost per Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) for patients in the 
United States who receive DBS surgery. Tomaszewski and Holloway concluded that DBS is 
cost-effective (less than $50,000 per QALY) when quality of life measures are improved by 
18% or more compared to patients without surgery. The authors argue that because post-
surgery improvements on the Unified Parkinson‘s Disease Rating Scale exceed 18%, DBS 
surgery is cost-effective (Tomaszewski & Holloway, 2001). 
Limitations of Tomaszewski and Holloway‘s study include the lack of long term data 
and the lack of quality of life measures. Improvements in quality of life were assumed to 
exactly correlate with improvements in the Unified Parkinson‘s Disease Rating Scale. There 
is no evidence in the literature to support using the Unified Parkinson‘s Disease Rating Scale 
as a substitute for a carefully constructed, valid and reliable quality of life questionnaire. This 
study also lacks a practical use because its societal perspective includes costs and benefits not 
experienced by the payer of the intervention (such as lost income and caregiver burden). As a 
result, Markov QALY studies rarely influence reimbursement decisions (Neumann, et al, 
2006). Although the authors recommend randomized trials to more fully examine the clinical 
and economic differences between DBS and pharmacy treatment alone, this seems 
impractical. Sham surgeries for blinded trials are difficult, and DBS would be even more 
difficult to blind because of the adjustment to the device through magnets in the chest. 
Overall, the model has value as a theoretical exercise, but does not seem to have realistic 
assumptions, results, or recommendations. 
 Eskander and co-authors examined practice patterns, clinical outcomes and charges 
associated with DBS and other surgeries for Parkinson‘s disease from 1996 to 2000 using the 
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Nationwide Inpatient Sample from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ). Eskander found that the median total hospital charge for all patients was $14,300. 
For the subset of patients who received DBS, the median total hospital charge was $35,700 
compared to $12,000 for the remainder of the procedures. This study reveals the practice 
shift toward DBS and its attendant expense. Additionally, Eskander found that mortality and 
morbidity were lower in hospitals that did PD surgeries more frequently (2003). This is a 
useful reminder that the cost-effectiveness of a surgical procedure can vary from institution 
to institution.  
 Eskander‘s research provides a foundation for my research because it uses the HCUP 
data, and the authors have shown the importance of controlling for the volume effect of 
surgical experience on outcomes. Unfortunately, the study included procedures other than 
DBS, and covers a period of time that encompassed a large change in treatment patterns. As 
discussed in Eskander, et al (2003), surgeries other than DBS were the mainstay in the early 
years of observation. This research will only look at DBS after the treatment patterns 
changed; and, will examine the consequences of a benefit expansion from Medicare on 
inpatient outcomes. 
 In response to increasing use of DBS surgery and to the emphasis on cost-
effectiveness, Green and co-authors did a cost effectiveness study that measured the costs 
and outcomes associated with another brain surgery for Parkinson‘s disease: unilateral and 
bilateral pallidotomy. Unlike DBS, this surgery damages tissue in the brain whereas DBS 
only stimulates the tissue. Because no device is involved, this surgery is less expensive than 
DBS surgery.The outcome measure selected was Hoehn and Yahr.  Green et al showed that a 
decrease in the Hoehn and Yahr scale of 0.87 resulted in an estimated savings to public 
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expenditures of €3593 annually. Consequently, Green asserts, pallidotomy pays for itself 
through savings within six years post surgery. Additionally, Green recommends that 
pallidotomy continues to be considered as a viable surgical intervention because it improves 
outcomes and is less expensive than DBS surgery (Green, Joint, Sethi, Bain & Aziz, 2004).   
Green does not address an element that is important to ongoing treatment of 
Parkinson‘s disease. Although pallidotomy appears cost-effective, this surgery permanently 
damages brain tissue and precludes the patient from undergoing DBS. Although pallidotomy 
is clinically appropriate for some patients, the subsequent loss of DBS as a treatment choice 
should be addressed as a ―cost‖ in the cost analysis. 
 D‘Ausilio and co-authors conducted a comparative economic study for advanced 
Parkinson‘s disease from the perspective of the National Health Service in Italy over a five 
year period. D‘Ausilio measured costs and outcomes for traditional therapy, apomorphine 
therapy, and DBS. The five year direct medical cost total for traditional therapy was €58,065 
(about $71,957); for subcutaneous apomorphine, €36,423 (about $45,145); and for DBS, 
€56,489 (about $70,015). D‘Ausilio concludes that taking into consideration both costs and 
effectiveness, apomorphine treatment and DBS surgery are less expensive that traditional 
therapy (D‘Ausilio, et al, 2003). Charles and co-authors followed 16 patients and measured 
their medication costs before and after DBS surgery in the United States. Before surgery, 
daily cost of medicine for Parkinson‘s disease was $19.53 and after surgery, the daily cost 
was $13.25.  On an annualized basis, this represents an annual savings of $2,292 (Charles, et 
al, 2004). The small sample is problematic for generalization, but the trend shows that the 
decrease in medication costs may be non-trivial. 
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Eskander and co-authors examined practice patterns, clinical outcomes and charges 
associated with DBS and other surgeries for Parkinson‘s disease from 1996 to 2000 using the 
Nationwide Inpatient Sample from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ). Eskander found that the median total hospital charge for all patients was $14,300. 
For the subset of patients who received DBS, the median total hospital charge was $35,700 
compared to $12,000 for the remainder of the procedures. This study reveals the practice 
shift toward DBS and its attendant expense. Additionally, Eskander found that mortality and 
morbidity were lower in hospitals that did PD surgeries more frequently (Eskandar, et al, 
2003). This is a useful reminder that the cost-effectiveness of a surgical procedure can vary 
from institution to institution.  
 Eskander‘s research is an excellent foundation for my research because it uses the 
HCUP data, and the authors have shown the importance of controlling for the volume effect 
of surgical experience on outcomes. Unfortunately, the study included procedures other than 
DBS, and covers a period of time that encompassed a large change in treatment patterns. As 
discussed in Eskander (2003), surgeries other than DBS were the mainstay in the early years 
of observation. This research will only look at DBS after the treatment patterns changed; and, 
will examine the consequences of a benefit expansion from Medicare on inpatient outcomes. 
Although the literature contains many studies assessing the costs and effectiveness of 
DBS surgery, none examines the consequences of expanding Medicare‘s benefit to reimburse 
DBS surgery for Parkinson‘s disease.  Furthermore, the work provides insights as to whether 
improved inpatient clinical outcomes accompany the newly reimbursed DBS device and 
surgery and will provide a context for determining the importance of cost management in 
Medicare administration. The often competing goals of ―excellent care‖ and ―affordable 
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cost‖ require research-driven policymaking that balances the price and promise of new 
intervention. 
 
Hospital and Surgeon Volume Effect 
 
Because this work will extend Eskander‘s work, it will be important to understand the 
surgical volume effect in more detail as it is an important element for policymakers to 
consider when examining treatment patterns and outcomes for surgical procedures. 
Governmental expansion of health benefits through Medicare has occurred 
incrementally since its inception in 1966. The prescription drug benefit (Part D) enacted in 
2006 is still causing substantial public discussion over benefit design, consumption patterns 
and costs. As big and expensive as the Medicare Prescription Drug program seems to be, 
other medical services delivered by Medicare consume much more of the budget. For 
example, the hospital insurance included in Part A is the single largest type of expense in 
Medicare and comprises 41% of expenditures whereas prescription drugs in Pard D comprise 
18% of expenditures (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009).  
A subset of Part A inpatient services, surgically implanted medical devices, is a 
growing set of medical procedures that includes implanting drug eluting stents, pacemakers, 
defibrillators, deep brain stimulation probes for Parkinson‘s disease and cochlear implants. 
The success of companies like Medtronic demonstrates the growth of medical devices in 
diabetes, heart disease and Parkinson‘s disease. Evaluation of a benefit change for a medical 
device constitutes an interesting contribution to the program design and evaluation literature 
because it is a growing portion of Part A, the largest, single contributor to the Medicare 
budget. The recent comparative effectiveness priority topics from the Institute of Medicine 
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(IOM) are consistent with this: 14 of the top 50 (28%) research topics for comparative 
effectiveness research from the Institute of Medicine include surgical interventions (IOM 
priorities).  
Evaluation of surgery poses special challenges that must be addressed when 
measuring whether a surgery meets its health policy goals. In 1965, Eisenman and Spencer 
coined the term ―The Occasional Open-Heart Surgeon,‖ in their editorial published in 
Circulation. In the editorial, the authors compare open-heart surgeons to pianists where 
technique suffers from even one day without practice. An early study referenced in the 
editorial showed that 41% of hospitals who claimed to do open-heart surgeries did fewer than 
ten procedures annually. Eisenman and Spencer (1965) commented: 
Not revealed, of course, is the far more elusive figure relating 
operative mortality with the frequency of operation. Its correlation 
must be left to the imagination! (p. 162) 
Over time, the literature has examined this relationship and found the correlation between 
volume of surgeries and mortality to be inverse. Facilities and surgeons with high volume 
practices have lower mortality rates than those with low volumes. For example, the 
relationship between the surgeon volume and facility volume to clinical and economic 
outcomes has been documented in many different types of surgeries. The literature reports 
higher facility volume was associated with lower mortality rates for the following surgeries: 
coronary artery bypass; pediatric cardiac surgery; carotid endarterectomy; surgery for 
unruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm; surgery to repair ruptured abdominal aortic 
aneurysm; lower-extremity arterial bypass surgery; pancreatic cancer surgery; esophageal 
cancer surger; breast cancer surgery; colorectal cancer surgery; lung cancer surgery; gastric 
cancer surgery; total hip replacement; total knee replacement; hip fracture repair; open 
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prostatectomy; transurethral prostatectomy; surgery for ruptured cerebral aneurysm; surgery 
for unruptured cerebral aneurysm (Halm, Lee & Chassin, 2002).  
Additionally, the literature reports higher surgeon volume was associated with lower 
mortality rates for the following surgeries: coronary artery bypass; pediatric cardiac surgery; 
carotid endarerectomy; surgery for unruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm; pancreatic cancer 
surgery; breast cancer surgery; colorectal cancer surgery; lung cancer surgery; gastric cancer 
surgery; and total hip replacement (Halm, Lee & Chassin, 2002). 
Finally, the Halm, Lee and Chassin (2002) review article mentions that while volume 
and outcomes associations were documented in the vast majority of the literature, very few of 
the studies incorporated adjustments for patient characteristics such as age or co-morbidities. 
This is problematic because age and co-morbidity burden can also affect outcomes. This is 
well documented:  Chernow (1999) found that age and gender affected outcomes in critically 
ill patients; Kim, et al, found that comorbidities could be a predictive risk factor in 
Laparoscopy-Assistive Distal Gastrectomy; Ory-Magne, et al (2007) found that the older the 
patient was for DBS surgery, the lower the improvement in quality of life as measured by 
mobility, activities of daily living and cognition; and Setoguchi, Solomon, Levin, and 
Winkelmayer (2008) found gender and age affect outcomes in Myocardial Infarction.  
Elixhauser, Steiner, Harris and Coffey (1998) points out that work in healthcare by 
policy makers must include corrections for the heterogeneity in the patient population, 
including co-morbidities: 
Measures of the overall medical condition of patients are essential for 
health care research, whether collecting data prospectively or using 
data that have been collected for another purpose. This is true for 
testing new treatments, assessing established ones, evaluating health 
plans and providers, or studying the impact of health care 
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policies….when using administrataive data, preexisting conditions, or 
comorbidities, should always be controlled. (pp. 8-9) 
In addition to the medical implant surgeries discussed above, a study examining all 
surgeries for PD, including DBS, was conducted and the study assessed the volume/practice 
effect. Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) was a subset of the population examined as part of a 
group of all PD surgeries by Eskander, et al (2003) using the Healthcare Cost & Utilization 
Project (HCUP) National Inpatient Sample (NIS). Only the DBS surgery involved a 
surgically implanted device. The study examined the effect of surgeon and facility volume on 
inpatient outcomes such as mortality, discharge to a short or long term care center, length of 
stay, and surgical complications. The results were consistent with that of other surgeries; that 
is, inpatient outcomes were better at facilities with higher volumes. However, during the time 
period of the study, there was dramatic change in the type of surgeries offered. The study 
covered surgeries from 1996 through 2000. In 1996, most PD surgeries were ablative (the 
burning of tissue without implantation of a device) and in 2000 most PD surgeries were 
surgically implanted medical devices for DBS. Further, the volume effect for just the DBS 
procedure was not reported separately (Eskander, et al, 2003). Therefore a new analysis 
would establish whether or not there was a facility/surgeon practice effect in DBS surgery 
specifically—and if so, the size of this effect. 
 The growth in the use of DBS surgery has expanded beyond PD and is being studied 
for: depression, epilepsy, Tourette‘s syndrome, pain (Coffey, 2008), hypertension (Pereira, 
Green, Nandi & Aziz, 2007), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (Denys & Mantione, 2009), 
tinnitus (Shi,  et al, 2009), and Schizophrenia (Mikell, et al, 2009). Some worry that these 
many potential uses may be the result of ―Gizmo Idolatry‖ and that they may be adopted 
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even when the evidence does not show any advantage over alternate interventions (Leff & 
Finucane, 2008). Leff and Finucane compare surgery to the activities of Veblen‘s Leisure 
Class: 
In The Theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen noted that in early 
societies, the upper leisure class performed high –prestige hunting and 
military exploits, while the lower classes performed menial work, such 
as agriculture, child-rearing, and cooking, which was arguably more 
important to survival of the society. Vestiges of this construct persist 
in medicine where surgical exploits are valued more highly than 
uneventful diligence or watchful waiting of primary care. (p. 1830) 
There are two reasons why an evaluation in DBS would be informative for subsequent 
research or evaluations of DBS: (1) DBS is being applied to many new, disease states thereby 
exposing a much larger number of patients to the treatment; and (2) most of these new 
disease states have established pharmaceutical-based treatment regimes. When comparing 
routine pharmaceutical treatment to surgically implanted devices, the issues relating to 
volume and surgery are particularly problematic because one cohort will be subject to the 
volume effect, and one cohort will not. Any policy or comparative effectiveness that 
compares pharmaceutical treatment to surgical treatment with DBS will need to account for 
the surgical volume effect in outcomes.  
On April 1, 2003 Medicare made a national coverage decision (NCD) for cover Deep 
Brain Stimulation (DBS) for Parkinson‘s disease (Leavitt, 2005). Generally, NCD‘s are not 
necessary. The Social Security Act does not provide a detailed list of covered procedures, 
services and treatments. Instead, the act prescribes coverage for services and treatments that 
are reasonable and necessary. It is the regional contractors decide to cover procedures and 
services if they deem them to be reasonable and necessary, in accordance with the guidelines 
in the Social Security Act. In fact, only 300 NCD‘s have been made over that last 30 years. 
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(Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, 2003).  The public can formally request 
an NCD, or: 
... CMS staff can initiate the process if they find that: (1) 
inconsistent local coverage policies exist; (2) the service 
represents a significant medical advance; (3) the service is the 
subject of substantial controversy; or (4) the potential for rapid 
diffusion or overuse exists. (p. 246) 
Prior to 2003, DBS had local coverage in some places, but it was inconsistent. Some 
local providers considered the procedure reasonable and necessary whereas others did not. 
The NCD mandates that all local providers provide a particular service or procedure, and this 
made access to DBS universal for appropriate patients. This particular coverage decision is 
interesting to examine because 1) it is a Part A expansion and therefore is part of the biggest 
service type in the Medicare budget; and 2) Parkinson‘s disease is chronic and progressive 
and selection bias may be introduced because the patients who initially get this procedure as 
a result of the NCD may be older and sicker than their counterparts in regions where the 
procedure was already covered which may cause longer lengths of stay for some and death 
for others; 3) DBS is amongst a growing set of surgical interventions that the baby boomers 
entering Medicare will use in increasing numbers—implantable medical devices; 4) DBS is a 
surgical procedure and therefore may be subject to the physician and facility practice effect; 
5) and the new disease states that will use DBS have established pharmaceutical treatments 
and therefore any comparison between the surgery and the pharmaceutical treatment must 
account for the surgery effect in the DBS. 
 These issues are important to examining whether health policy goals have been met 
because failing to recognize these complexities could lead to an incorrect assessment of the 
success or failure of the benefit expansion. In particular, surgically implantable devices in 
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chronic, progressive disease states pose special problems that must be addressed. Failure to 
recognize and account for these issues can lead to incorrect conclusions in program 
assessment. 
On its website, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) speaks directly to the 
beneficiary and explains Medicare‘s goal: ―Medicare‘s goal is to make it easy for you to get 
the highest quality health care at the most affordable price. Medicare is transforming itself 
from a program which simply pays the bills to a program which actively supports a high 
quality health care system,‖ (http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf, 
2009, p. 2).  
Therefore, measuring whether a Medicare benefit expansion reaches its goal includes 
three parts. Firstly, is access improved—that is, are more procedures consumed due to the 
benefit expansion? Secondly, are the outcomes high quality—that is, are lengths of stay, 
complications and mortality minimized? Lastly, are the outcomes affordable? In short, policy 
success is dependent upon the clinical and economic outcomes of the expanded benefit. 
The DBS benefit expansion can be evaluated against the Medicare goal of improved 
access to this surgery by identifying the consumption of this health care surgery before and 
after the NCD. Overall, however, we should see more total surgeries, more physicians 
performing the procedures, and more facilities offering the surgery.  
Increased consumption of the DBS procedure is only part of the evaluation. Medicare 
is also interested in ―high quality‖ healthcare, and volumetric access alone does not measure 
quality. One approach to measuring high quality outcomes is to measure lengths of stay and 
mortality for the procedures. But, in doing this, we must check and possibly correct for a 
selection bias introduced by the kind of patients entering surgery post NCD. 
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Parkinson‘s disease is a progressive disease; patients who waited until the NCD to 
have the surgery are older and may have developed more co-morbidities. This ―backlog‖ of 
surgery candidates who have these risk factors may result in more deaths, more surgical 
complications, and longer lengths of stay. However, this effect may be temporary, and should 
subside over time as the ―backlog‖ of older, sicker patients move through the system. 
Other variables that may affect outcomes measures such as length of stay and 
mortality are the experience levels of the facility and/or surgeon doing the procedure.  The 
literature shows that the more procedures a physician or facility does, the better the 
outcomes. Combined with the ―backlog‖ of more complex patients, inexperienced surgeons 
and facilities may produce worse outcomes initially. Again, this effect should be temporary, 
and should subside over time as facilities and surgeons become more experienced with the 
surgery. Therefore, outcomes measures in the short term may differ from outcomes measures 
over time. Success in this kind of benefit expansion must take into consideration that the 
inpatient outcomes of a surgical benefit expansion may not be permanent, and a different, 
more positive outlook would be provided in evaluations that took into account some delay 
before inpatient outcomes improved. 
The inexperience of facilities, surgeons, and the ―backlog‖ of older, sicker patients 
may initially increase mortality rates, and may initially produce longer lengths of stay in the 
hospital for some patients. These longer lengths of stay may lead to higher hospital bills. 
Therefore, in the short term, it may appear that inpatient outcomes are worse, and charges are 
higher—a most uncomfortable result. However, over time, facilities and surgeons should 
improve with practice, and the backlog of sicker patients will move through the system. 
Subsequently, outcomes may improve while average charges decline in the longer term. 
 32 
As discussed throughout this document, if a policy-maker were to only look at the 
initial expenses and outcomes of DBS surgery for Parkinson‘s disease, a grim picture of 
poorer outcomes and higher expenses might be observed. But this may be temporary. Over 
time, the effects of sicker patients and inexperienced facilities or surgeons diminishes and the 
more accurate effect of the policy on inpatient outcomes would be revealed.   
These challenges for policymakers were the motivation for this study examining 
whether longer term outcomes mirror short term outcomes before and after an NCD for DBS 
in Parkinson‘s disease. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Introduction 
 
This study retrospectively examined the consequences to inpatient clinical and 
economic outcomes of a benefit change at the national level for CMS. The years from 1999 
to 2007 were used for this cross-sectional analysis. Because this is a pre and post design, only 
states that had data in at least two years pre and two years post were accepted into this 
observational analysis.  The results are generalizable for the 24 states included in the study:  
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Massachusettes, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, New 
York, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.   
Short-term analysis examined 12 months before the benefit explantion (January 1, 
1999 to March 31, 2003); and 12 months after the benefit expansion (April 1, 2003 March 
30,2004). Long –term analysis examined the four years, three months prior to the benefit 
change (January 1, 1999 to March 30, 2003); and the four years, nine months post the benefit 
change (April 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007). The framework for the analysis is illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
 
Data 
 
 The HCUP dataset is supported by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ), which is part of the Centers for Medicare and Medicate Services (CMS). The 
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Health Care Utilization Project National Inpatient Sample (HCUP NIS) data that Eskander, et 
al, used for their study of PD surgeries published in 2009 is the selected dataset for analysis. 
Policymakers use this dataset to track healthcare resource utilization, quality, access, charges 
and outcomes (HCUP NIS, 2009). Findings from this work are published and available on 
the HCUP website and they cover a range of topics including: the care of adults with mental 
health and substance abuse disorders; care of children and adolescents in U.S. hospitals; 
economic and health costs of Diabetes; and serving the uninsured. Additionally, this dataset 
is used by researchers nationwide and their results have been published in The New England 
Journal of Medicine, The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Annals of 
Thoracic Surgery, Cancer, Health Services Research, Surgery, PharmacoEconomics, Health 
Affairs, Value in Health, Health Economics, Journal of the American Geriatric Society, The 
American Journal of Public Health, The American Journal of Managed Care, The Journal of 
Health Care for the Poor and Underserved, and others (HCUP Website, 2009). 
The HCUP NIS data is the best available data for an evaluation of whether Medicare 
policy goals are being met with the Medicare coverage of DBS surgery for PD. Steiner, 
Elixhauser, and Schnaier (2002) explains the attributes of the data; it is: the largest collection 
of all-payer, uniform, state-based inpatient surgery administrative data; the data covers the 
years of interest: 1999 through 2007; inpatient outcomes are available such as length of stay, 
complication rate, mortality, discharge to home, short term facility, or long term facility; 
patient characteristics are available such as race, sex, age, geographic region, and median 
household income for patient‘s zip code (in categories); hospital characteristics are available 
such as bed size, teaching status, urban/rural, ownership status and U.S. region; hospital 
surgery volume is available; physician level volume is available; the large size of the 
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database allows analysis of relatively rare procedures such as DBS for Parkinson‘s disease; 
HCUP is the only hospital database with charge information on all patients regardless of their 
insurance carrier or insurance status including Medicare, Medicaid, private coverage, or no 
coverage; the dataset is representative for participating states and provides a generalizable 
sample of inpatient volume, outcomes and charges. 
Steiner, et al, 2002, also articulates limitations of this dataset: disease-specific stage 
of disease is not always available (for some diseases, this is only available retrospectively 
through chart abstraction or through prospective collection); laboratory data is not available; 
patients cannot be tracked long term (the NIS sample provides information about inpatient 
outcomes through discharge status). 
The HCUP NIS data has powerful advantages and some notable disadvantages. 
Overall, however, the dataset provided information about DBS inpatient clinical and 
economic outcomes as well as indications of benefit expansion policy success.  This 
evaluation on DBS for Parkinson‘s disease informs policy makers as to what issues may need 
attention when examining results of demonstration projects to test benefit expansions and 
would inform administrators whether more expensive, longer-term, possibly prospective 
studies are necessary for PD patients receiving DBS in Medicare. 
This study design and data was submitted to the University of Missouri—Kansas City 
Social Sciences Institutional Review Board (IRB) and received a waiver because the data is 
de-identified and publicly available. 
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Analysis Framework 
 
Outcomes of interest were measured before and after the Medicare benefit expansion 
that made reimbursement for Deep Brain Stimulation a national requirement. The effective 
date of this reimbursement change was April 1, 2003. Additionally, outcomes in the short run 
and the long run will be examined. The short run will compare 12 months pre reimbursement 
decision to 12 months post the reimbursement decision. The long run will compare all data 
from 1999 to April 1, 2003 to the data from April 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Analysis Framework--CMS National Coverage Decision  
Enacted April 1, 2003 
 
 
April 1, 2003 
 
2007 
Long Term:  01/01/99 – 03/31/02 pre vs. 04/01/04 – 12/31/07 post 
Short Term:  12 months pre vs. 12 months 
post  
 
Full Sample 
Sub Sample 
Full Sample 
Sub Sample 
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The HCUP sample of hospital discharges from 1999 through 2007 includes 
70,052,217 inpatient hospital stays.  Figures 2 and 3 describe the process that leads to the 
four samples examined in this study.   
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Inclusion / Exclusion Criteria and Sample Size  
for All Data Without Physician Variable 
 
 
 
Sample Size – Full Sample  
1999 through 2007 Hospital Discharges 
N=70,052,217 
Diagnosed with Parkinson’s Disease  ICD-9:  332 
N=564,527 
Had DBS Procedure Code:  PR1-PR15  
N=3,670 
Date of Surgery Known 
N=3,370 
Short-Term: 
April 2002 – March 2004 
 
 N=911 
Long-Term 
 January 1999 – March 2002 
and April 2004 – December 
2007 
N=2,459 
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Figure 3.  Inclusion / Exclusion Criteria and Sample Size for  
Records where Physician Volume was Available 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The objective of this study is to evaluate whether patient characteristics receiving 
DBS after changes in the NCD are different than patient characteristics receiving DBS before 
the change. In addition, changes in the utilization of the procedure, physician characteristics 
or hospital characteristics will be assessed.  
 
Sample Size – Subset 
1999 through 2007 Hospital Discharges 
N=70,052,217 
Diagnosed with Parkinson’s Disease ICD-9:  332 
N=564,527 
Had DBS Procedure Code:  PR1-PR15 
N=3,670 
Doctor Volume Data Available 
N=1,593 
Short-Term: 
 N=460 
Long-Term 
 N=1,133 
Date of Surgery Known 
N=3,370 
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Patient and Service Characteristics in the Short Term 
 
 
H0 Patient Characteristics do not differ in the short term pre- and post- periods (age, 
sex, income, race, payer, Admission type, admission source, co-morbidities, length of stay, 
complications, disposition at discharge, per patient charges) 
HA Patient Characteristics differ in the short term pre- and post- periods (age, sex, income, 
race, payer, Admission type, admission source, co-morbidities, length of stay, complications, 
disposition at discharge, per patient charges) 
 
Physician and Hospital Characteristics in the Short Term 
 
H0 Hospital and Physician Characteristics do not differ in the short term pre- and 
post- periods (bedsize, urban, teaching, ownership, state, region, number of facilities 
providing surgery, number of physicians associated with surgery, number of procedures per 
physician, number of procedures per hospital) 
HA Hospital and Physician Characteristics differ in the short term pre- and post- periods 
(bedsize, urban, teaching, ownership, state, region, number of facilities providing surgery, 
number of physicians associated with surgery, number of procedures per physician, number 
of procedures per hospital) 
Longer term evaluations are also completed as noted in the short-term evaluation. 
 
 40 
Patient and Services Characteristics in the Long Term 
 
 
H0 Patient Characteristics do not differ in the long term pre- and post- periods (age, 
sex, income, race, payer, Admission type, admission source, co-morbidities, length of stay, 
complications, disposition at discharge, per patient total charges) 
HA Patient Characteristics differ in the long term pre- and post- periods (age, sex, 
income, race, payer, Admission type, admission source, co-morbidities, length of stay, 
complications, disposition at discharge, per patient total charges) 
 
Physician and Hospital Characteristics in the Long Term 
 
H0 Hospital and Physician Characteristics do not differ in the long term pre- and post- 
periods (bedsize, urban, teaching, ownership, state, region, number of facilities providing 
surgery, number of physicians associated with surgery, number of procedures per physician, 
number of procedures per hospital) 
HA Hospital and Physician Characteristics differ in the long term pre- and post- 
periods (bedsize, urban, teaching, ownership, state, region, number of facilities providing 
surgery, number of physicians associated with surgery, number of procedures per physician, 
number of procedures per hospital) 
Hypotheses using multivariate analysis to assess whether having the procedure in the 
post period was a determinant of outcomes of interest:  complications, discharge status, 
length of stay, and total charges (mean per patient). 
HO Having the procedure within the 12 months after the NCD is not a determinant of 
complications, discharge status, length of stay, and total charges.  
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HA Having the procedure within 12 months after the NCD is a determinant of 
complications, discharge status, length of stay, and total charges. 
Longer term evaluations are also assessed. 
HO Having the procedure beyond 12 months after the NCD is not a determinant of 
complications, discharge status, length of stay, and total charges.  
HA Having the procedure beyond 12 months after the NCD is a determinant of 
complications, discharge status, length of stay, and total charges. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
 
Variables derived from the HCUP dataset for the evaluation are provided in Appendix 
A. All dollar amounts used in these analyses were converted into 2003 U.S. dollars, the year 
of the benefit expansion.  The following tests were completed: short term descriptive 
statistics and p-values using t-tests for continuous variables and chi square for the categorical 
variables; long term descriptive statistics and p-values using t-tests for continuous variables 
and chi square for the categorical variables; short run determinants of complications; long 
run determinants of complications; short run determinants of discharge disposition; long run 
determinants of discharge disposition; short run determinants of length of stay; long run 
determinants of length of stay . 
 Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation and p-values) were applied to the 
short and long term data. Each independent variable was tested to see if they differed pre- 
and post- NCD. Categorical variables will be tested with Chi Square tests and continuous 
variables were tested with t-statistics or for differences in distribution. 
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Multivariate analyses were applied to the short term and the long term data to identify 
determinants of complications (logistic regression), discharge location (logistic regression), 
length of stay (ordinary least squares) and total charges (ordinary least squares).  In 
particular, the author was interested in whether the explanatory variable MEDREIMB (0 for 
before NCD, 1 for after NCD) was a determinant of these outcomes of interest. Explanatory 
variables were chosen to align with the theory and literature presented in Chapter 2 to test 
hypotheses. 
Multivariate Hierarchical analyses were conducted to identify determinants of 
outcome variables of interest. As an alternate specification, hierarchical models were used to 
take into consideration inter-hospital variation.  Hierarchical models are appropriate when 
there are nested classes of data (Houchens, Chu & Steiner, 2007).  In these HCUP data, 
patients were nested within physicians, and physicians are nested within hospitals.  Physician 
volume is not available the whole sample, so the analyses had patient nested within hospital 
for the full sample in both the long and short term; and it was planned that the subsample 
would have patient nested within physician nested within hospital for the short and long term 
subsample where physician volume is available.  However, there was insufficient sample to 
perform this test.  Instead, the two level testing was used on both the full and sub-sample. 
When the dependent variable was binary as they were for the complications and 
mortality variables, logistic regression was applied. Fit was checked with the likelihood ratio 
(Kmenta, 2003/2004) and appropriate adjustments made, such as log transformations, if the 
fit was not good.  
If the dependent variable was a count variable, such as length of stay, a negative 
binomial model was applied to both short and long term scenarios.  
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 Statistical analysis will be completed using SAS v. 9.1.  The [output/code/data 
analysis] for this paper was generated using SAS/STAT software, Version 9.1, SAS Institute, 
Inc., Cary, North Carolina, USA.  An a priori alpha is set at 0.05. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
Study Cohort 
 
Table 1 outlines the demographic characteristics of the study population. Three 
thousand four hundred twenty eight beneficiaries were included in the evaluation of DBS use 
in PD patients between 1999 and 2007. The population is predominantly male, greater than 
63 years of age and had relatively low overall disease severity.  Most procedures were 
elective and performed within large teaching hospitals located in either the south or western 
part of the United States. Total average hospital payments, per procedure were $47,000 (2003 
US $$). Across all patient, payer and provider types, complications from DBS procedures 
were rare (<6%) with patients primarily discharged to home following the procedure and 
subsequent hospitalization. 
 
Table 1 
 
Demographics of the Study Population  
 
VARIABLE FREQUENCY PERCENT MISSING 
Sex    
     Male 2221 67.20  
     Female 1084 32.80  
   65 
 
Table 1 Continued 
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VARIABLE FREQUENCY PERCENT MISSING 
Income    
< $44,999  1362 41.83  
> $45,000 1894 58.17  
   114 
Primary Payer    
     Medicare 2157 64.04  
     Medicaid 65 1.93  
     Private  1083 32.75  
     Self Pay/No Chg 21 0.03  
     Other Ins. 42 1.25  
   2 
Admission Source    
     ER 23 0.71  
     Another Hosp or 
Facility 
34 1.05  
Routine 3189 98.24  
   124 
Admission Type    
     Emergency 99 3.96  
     Urgent 93 3.72  
     Elective 2310 92.33  
   868 
Region for Hosp    
     NEast 314 9.32  
     Midwest 629 18.66  
     South 1239 36.77  
     West 1188 35.25  
   0 
Teaching Hosp    
     Non Teaching 494 14.66  
     Teaching 2876 85.34  
   0 
 
Table 1 Continued 
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VARIABLE FREQUENCY PERCENT MISSING 
Bedsize    
     Small 147 4.36  
     Medium 221 6.56  
     Large 3002 89.08  
   0 
Any Complications    
     False 3174 94.18  
     True 196 5.82  
   0 
Discharge Loc.    
     STC/LTC/Died 283 8.41  
     Home 3082 91.59  
   5 
Before or After NCD    
     False (Before 
NCD) 
1341 39.79  
     True (After NCD) 2029 60.21  
   0 
 
 
Table 2   
 
Means for Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Min Max Mean SD 
Age 3340 19 89 63.46 10.11 
Charlson 
(Range 0 = low 
severity to 6 = 
high severity) 
3370 0 4 0.2228 0.5103 
# Disch/Hosp 3370 3452 114163 29653.61 14587.94 
 
Table 2 Continued 
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Variable N Min Max Mean SD 
#DBS/Hosp 3370 1 232 76.68 60.77 
#DBS/MD 1593 1 58 26.61 17.75 
LOS 3370 0 99 2.42 3.77 
Total 
Charges/Patient 
3152 551 357442 47565.56 30511.69 
 
 
The data presented above describes the complete cohort of patient used in the 
evaluation. For the purposes of univariate and multivariate an inference, two additional types 
of analyses are completed. The first study reviews univariate and multivariates changes that 
occur 1 year before and 1 year after implementation of the NCD. For the first evaluation the 
pre/post period extends 1 year prior to the implementation of the NCD and includes data for 
1 year after the implementation. The second evaluation considers a longer study period with 
the pre-assessment period defined as procedures completed between the periods of January 1, 
1999 to March 31
st
, 2002 and the post-evaluation period occurring between the dates of 
April, 2004 to December, 2007.  
 
Short Term (1 Year Pre & 1 Year Post) Descriptive Evaluation 
 
 
Changes in patient characteristics and outcomes before and after the adoption of the 
NCD are presented in Table 3. Overall, patient specific variables were consistent across both 
periods. Temporal trends in patient age before and after implementation of NCD are also 
presented in Figure 1. Prior to the NCD, most patients receiving DBS were less than 65 years 
of age. After implementation of NCD, the average age of the patient population receiving 
DBS increased, but only incrementally (Table 3). 
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Table 3 
 
Short Term (1 year Pre & 1 years Post) Evaluation Subsample 
 
 
 
Variable 
Pre 
(N=253) 
Post 
(N=207) 
 
 
P 
Value 
N or 
Mean 
% or 
SD 
N or 
Mean 
% or 
SD 
Patient Characteristics 
Female 80 31.62 76 36.71 0.2509 
AGE 62.68 9.2571 63.831 10.11 0.2053 
CHARLSON 0.2253 0.4636 0.2512 0.4973 0.5641 
Income <$45,000 117 47.56 90 45.00 0.5896 
Insurance Type      
     Medicare 162 64.03 131 63.29 0.9589 
     Medicaid***        
     Private/incl HMO 79 31.23 68 32.82  
     Other Insurance***      
Admission & Hospital Characteristics 
Admission Source      
     Emergency Room***      
     Long Term Care & 
Other*** 
     
     Ambulatory 247 98.41 200 96.62  
Admission type      
     Emergency***      
     Urgent***      
     Elective 243 96.05 199 96.14  
Region of Country      
     Northeast 16 6.32 23 11.11 <0.0001* 
     Midwest 154 60.87 60 28.99  
     South 82 32.41 111 53.62  
     West***      
Teaching Hospital 230 90.91 179 86.47 0.1317 
Hospital Size     <0.0001* 
     Small ***      
     Medium  17 6.72 20 9.66  
     Large  230 90.91 157 75.85  
 
Table 3 Continued 
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Variable 
Pre 
(N=253) 
Post 
(N=207) 
 
 
P 
Value 
N or 
Mean 
% or 
SD 
N or 
Mean 
% or 
SD 
# PROC PER HOSP 79.245 34.73 62.903 35.92 <0.0001* 
Mean Total Charges 43,577 25,562 41,400 24,004 0.3509 
Physician Characteristics 
# PROC PER MD 33.356 17.22 22.473 14.68 <0.0001* 
Patient Outcomes  
Complications***      
Discharge Location--Home 235 92.89 184 90.20 0.5816 
LOS (Length of Stay) 2.071 1.8166 2.1449 1.8794 0.6865 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
***denotes a redaction to comply with HCUP requirements  
NOTE:  n=460 
 
 
The number of procedures per physician declined after the implementation of the 
NCD (Figure 5). This could reflect either a reduction in the number of procedure performed 
by physician (i.e.if reimbursement for the procedure declined after the implementation of the 
NCD). Alternatively, in response to a new funding environment, physicians who had not 
previous performed DBS may have decided to begin seeing PD patients eligible for DBS and 
performing the procedure when warranted.  For the entire pre period, there were 98 
physicians; and for the entire post period, there were 152 physicians. 
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Quarter 
Figure 4.  Temporal Trends in Age of Patients Receiving DBS 
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Figure 5:  Average Number of Procedures Per Physician  
 Date of Benefit Expansion 
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No statistically significant differences were observed by admission types or hospital 
characteristics except the geographical region where procedures were most likely to be 
performed. A statistically significant increase in the number of procedures completed in the 
South was noted (p< 0.001). In contrast, fewer procedures were performed in the Midwest in 
the post period compared to the pre-assessment period. After implementation of the NDC, 
more procedures were performed in small hospitals compared to the pre-assessment period.  
 
Short Term Multivariate Analysis 
 
Univariate analysis provides limit insights into key determinants of a given outcome. 
In light of this, the author chose to perform multiple multivariate regression models to assess 
key determinants of various outcomes of interest. The four outcomes of interest included (1) 
complication rates post procedure; (2) patient disposition post procedure; (3) length of stay 
and (4) total charges.  
 
Complication Rates 
 
Multivariate logistic model were used to identify statistically significant factors 
influencing complication rate (1 = presence of any complication; 0 = no complication) and 
patient disposition coded to reflect the patient release to either home or long term/short term 
care. A negative binomial model was used to evaluate variations in patient‘s length of 
hospital stay.  A negative binomial model was chosen because it does not assume that 
individuals randomly experience events as the Poisson distribution does (Ellison & 
Bauchner, 2007). Because of the skewed nature of distributions of cost data, variations in 
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total charges were evaluated using an ordinary least squares model on log transformed cost 
data. 
 Data specific to the outcomes of the evaluation seeking a better understanding of 
factors influencing complication rates are provided in Table 4. It is not surprising that those 
patients whose baseline clinical characteristics imply greater disease severity as measured by 
the Charlson co-morbidity score were 1.629 times more likely to have a complication post 
procedure (OR=1.629, p=0.0369) than healthier counterparts. The Charlson co-morbidity 
score spans from 1 (low disease burden) to 6 (high disease burden).  Dementia would earn 
one point, for example, whereas someone with a metasticized malignant tumor would earn 
six points.  The scale predicts one year mortality.  A score of 1 has an attendant 12% chance 
of 1 year mortality wheras as score of 5 or 6 has an attendant 85% 1 year mortality 
(Charlson, Pompei, Ales, & MacKenzie, 1987). A Patient whose surgery was performed in 
the Midwest also appeared to have about 78% lower chance of  complications than patients 
treated in the Northeast region of the country (OR=0.219, p=0.0356). The data related to the 
number of procedures performed in a given institution support the ―volume theory‖ discussed 
in a prior section of this paper. Individuals whose DBS surgery was completed in a high 
volume institution had better outcomes and slightly fewer—about 1%-- complications 
(OR=1.009, p < 0.0039).  
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Table 4 
 
Complications – Short Run Full Sample 
 
Logistic Multivariate Model 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
AGE 1.010 0.976 – 1.045 0.5767 
FEMALE 1.030 0.569 – 1.864 0.9231 
INCOME <$44,999 0.765 0.409 – 1.434 0.4036 
MEDICAID 3.934 0.741 – 20.895 0.1079 
MEDICARE 1.145 0.556 – 2.360 0.7132 
ERTYPE 3.971 0.637 – 24.766 0.1398 
CHARLSON 1.629 1.030 – 2.576 0.0369* 
MIDWEST 0.219 0.053 – 0.903 0.0356* 
SOUTH 0.555 0.232 – 1.327 0.1855 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 1.151 0.457 – 2.902 0.7649 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 0.860 0.099 – 7.479 0.8911 
# TOTAL HOSP DISCH. 1.00 1.000 -- 1.000 0.2192 
#DBS PROC IN HOSP 1.009 1.003 – 1.016 0.0039* 
MEDREIMB 1.043 0.584 – 1.863 0.8870 
 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE:  n=911 
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Short term complication studies were also conducted on a data set that not only 
included the factors considered in the above study, but also included physician specific data 
related to the number of procedures a given physician performed over a specific period of 
time. Discussion exists as to whether a logistic model or hierarchical model is best to assess 
the influence of physician practice nested within a given institution. Therefore, the results of 
the logistic models are presented here and hierarchal models specifications are presented in a 
subsequent section of the paper.  
Table 5 provides a summary of the outcomes of logistic data model when 
consideration is also given to physician procedure volume. Based upon the outcome of the 
assessment, three determinants of complication rates were revealed. These three determinants 
suggest that patients enrolled in the Medicaid program who undergo DBS are 10.541 times 
more likely to have complications (OR=10.541, p=0.0259) than those with private insurance. 
What is not known is whether the observed effect is due to the payer type or the underlying 
baseline clinical characteristics of the patient population. Medicaid by its mission is 
responsible for supporting the provision of can for underserved populations. Patients 
receiving care in institutions located in both the Midwest and South were about 87% and 
83%  less likely to have complications (OR=0.129, p=0.0251) and (OR, 0.168, p=0.0268), 
respectively. 
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Table 5 
 
Complications - Short Run Including Physician Practice Volume 
 
Logistic Multivariate Model 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
AGE 0.966 0.907 – 1.030 0.2917 
FEMALE 2.052 0.705 – 5.972 0.1872 
INCOME < $44,999 0.974 0.319 – 2.971 0.9628 
MEDICAID 10.541 1.328 – 83.670 0.0259* 
MEDICARE 1.344 0.346 – 5.226 0.6694 
ERTYPE 1.379 0.090 – 21.196 0.8175 
CHARLSON 0.580 0.153 – 2.196 0.4229 
MIDWEST 0.129 0.022 – 0.774 0.0251* 
SOUTH 0.168 0.035 – 0.815 0.0268* 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 0.915 0.084 – 9.928 0.9420 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 2.848 0.217 – 37.439 0.4259 
TOTAL DISCH PER  
HOSP 
1.000 1.000 – 1.000 0.0272* 
# DBS PER HOSP 0.979 0.957 – 1.002 0.0674 
# DBS PER MD 1.015 0.975 – 1.056 0.4737 
MEDREIMB 0.671 0.181 – 2.491 0.5515 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE:  n=460 
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Patient Disposition 
 
The second outcome of interest in the evaluation was patient disposition. For this 
evaluation, categorical variables are used to define patients whose disposition post hospital 
stay is either to home or into a short term/long term facility. Like before the evaluation is 
conducted using data which does not take into account physician variables (Table 6) and then 
another that does consider physician effects (Table 7).  
When physician effects are not considered, the results of the study reveal five factors 
related to the patient post hospital disposition (Table 6). The first factor identified was payer 
type. Medicaid beneficiaries are 9.97 times more likely to be released to care settings other 
than home (OR =9.967, p=0.0008). The same effects were observed with Medicare 
beneficiaries who were 2.7 times more likely to be released to care settings other than home 
(OR=2.704, p=0.0053). These results are intuitive given the fact that both Medicaid and 
Medicare programs funded rehabilitation type care as part of their beneficiary programs. 
Therefore, the cost to families for extended care services for individuals served by Medicaid 
and Medicare are relatively low. As seen previously, the patient‘s co-morbidity score is also 
correlated with a 1.63 times increased probability of the patient being discharge to an 
extended care facility (OR=1.626, p=0.0145). In contrast to trends observed in prior 
evaluations, patients receiving surgery in the West were also less likely by 84% to to be 
released to an extended care facility compared to someone in the Northeast (OR =0.159, 
p=0.0005.) 
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Table 6 
 
Patient Disposition – Short Run Full Sample Without Physician Volume Variable 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
AGE 1.030 1.000 – 1.061 0.0517 
FEMALE 0.923 0.561  -- 1.518 0.7530 
INCOME < $44,999 0.615 0.367 – 1.030 0.0648 
MEDICAID 9.967 2.602 – 38.175 0.0008* 
MEDICARE 2.704 1.343 – 5.444 0.0053* 
CHARLSON 1.626 1.011 – 2.402 0.0145* 
ANYCOMP 2.846 1.392 – 5.817 0.0041* 
MIDWEST 0.412 0.159 – 1.065 0.0672 
WEST 0.159 0.057 – 0.444 0.0005* 
SOUTH 0.435 0.161 – 1.177 0.1010 
TEACHING HOSP 1.744 0.785 – 3.728 0.1766 
BEDSIZE SMALL 0.227 0.046 -  1.116 0.0681 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 0.585 0.162 – 2.112 0.4134 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP 1.000 1.000 -   1.000 0.03333* 
# DBS / HOSP 1.000 0.995 – 1.005 0.9965 
MEDREIMB 1.343 0.823 – 2191 0.2380 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE:  n=911 
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 When physician variables were included in the model, discharge status outcomes 
(Table 7) remain consistent that those previously observed for Medicaid.  That is, Medicaid 
beneficiaries were 50.35 times more likely to be released to extended care than those with 
private insurance as the primary payer (OR =60.348, p<0.0001); and Medicare beneficiaries 
were 4.12 times more likely to be released to extended care than those with private insurance 
as the primary payer (OR =4.115, p=0.0322).  Region in which care is provided also 
influence patient discharge status with patients receiving care in the South 88%  less likely to 
be discharged to home (OR=0.114, p=0.0139). Hospital characteristics were also observed to 
influence discharge disposition. As noted previously, the volume theory for hospitals is also 
implicated in the current analysis. Hospitals doing more procedures have patients who are 
more 2% more likely to be discharged to home and less likely to require additional care 
(OR= 0.981, p=0.0456). Patients were more 3.67 times more likely to be discharged to 
short/long term care after the implementation of the NCD (OR=3.671, p=0.0249); and 
patients who received care from physicians performing numerous procedures were 1.05 times 
more likely to be released to home (OR=1.051, p=0.0057). It is feasible that these to 
observations may be linked. If reimbursement increased after the NCD, more inexperienced 
physicians may elect to perform the procedure. If the physician is not experienced with the 
procedure, it is feasible that the outcomes could be less favorable.  
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Table 7 
 
Patient Disposition – Short Run with Physician Variable 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
AGE 1.020 0.968 – 1.075 0.4487 
FEMALE 1.339 0.627 —3.120 0.4126 
INCOME < $44,999 0.933 0.411 – 2.119 0.8686 
MEDICAID 60.348 9.473 – 384.458 <0.0001* 
MEDICARE 4.115 1.127 – 15.018 0.0322* 
CHARLSON 0.874 0.3679 – 2.017 0.7523 
ANYCOMP 0.908 0.149 – 5.555 0.9172 
MIDWEST 0.985 0.275 – 3.524 0.9812 
WEST 0.123 0.009 – 1.691 0.1172 
SOUTH 0.114 0.020 – 0.643 0.0139* 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 0.544 0.107 – 2.768 0.4634 
BEDSIZE SMALL 0.819 0.074 – 9.083 0.8708 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 1.385 0.191 – 10.066 0.7477 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP 1.000 1.000 --  1.000 0.2830 
# DBS PER HOSP 0.981 0.963 – 1.000 0.0456* 
# DBS PER PHYSICIAN 1.051 1.015 – 1.089 0.0057* 
MEDREIMB 3.671 1.178 – 11.441 0.0249* 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE:  n=460 
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Length of Stay 
 
 The third outcome model evaluates variations in the average length of hospital stay 
for PD patients undergoing DBS. When physician variables are not considered (Table 8), 
several factors emerge as potential determinants of average length of hospital stay. Those 
positively associated with increased length of stay include patient age where a change in one 
year of age is associated with a 0.014 increase in length of stay (0.01404, p=0.0031); a 
Medicare beneficiary where Medicare as payer is associated with a 0.2142 day longer length 
of stay (0.2142,p=0.0045); a change of 1 in a patient‘s co morbidities score is associated with 
a 0.1684 day increase in length of stay (0.1684, p=0.0018); and a patient experiencing  
procedural complications is associated with a 0.613 day longer length of stay (0.6183, 
<0.0001); and receiving care at a teaching hospital is associated with a 0.7288 day longer 
length of stay (0.7288, p=0.0001) . Patients receiving care in the Midwest tended to have a 
shorter length of stay by .39 days (-0.3991, p=0.0035) as did those receiving DBS in small, 
by .67 days (-0.6706, p=0.0003) and medium, by .71 days, sized hospitals (-0.7103, 
p=<0.0001). 
 
Table 8 
 
Length of Stay – Short Run without Physician Variable  
 
Variable Estimate Chi Square P-Value 
INTERCEPT -0.1677 0.38 0.5379 
AGE 0.01404 8.77 0.0031* 
FEMALE 0.0513 0.71 0.4011 
 
Table 8 Continued 
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Variable Estimate Chi Square P-Value 
INCOME < $44,999 -0.0882 1.99 0.1583 
MEDICAID 0.1396 0.39 0.5310 
MEDICARE 0.2142 8.08 0.0045* 
ERSOURCE 0.4794 0.36 0.5471 
ERTYPE -0.8401 1.38 0.2407 
CHARLSON 0.1684 9.75 0.0018* 
ANYCOMP 0.6183 34.35 <0.0001* 
MIDWEST -0.3991 8.55 0.0035* 
WEST -0.1459 1.13 0.2884 
SOUTH 0.1607 1.29 0.2554 
TEACHING 
HOSPITAL 
0.7288 56.13 0.0001* 
BEDSIZE SMALL -0.6706 13.00 0.0003* 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM -0.7103 17.60 <0.0001* 
TOTAL HOSP 
DISCH 
0.0000 3.82 0.0506 
# DBS PER HOSP -0.0007 1.32 0.2507 
MEDREIMB -0.0154 0.06 0.7989 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE:  n=911 
 
 Table 9 describes the results for the length of stay variable in the short term when 
physician influence is considered. There are 10 determinants of length of stay:  female, 
positively associated with length of stay where being femaile is associated with 0.1809 of a 
day longer stay in the hospital(0.1809, p=0.0123); Medicare as payer, positively associated 
with length of stay where the result is a 0.3462 of a day longer stay in the hospital (0.3462, 
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p=0.0002); Emergency room as the admission source, positively associated with length of 
stay where the result is 1.9 more days in the hospital (1.9383, p=0.0235); Midwest region, 
negatively associated with length of stay where the result is 0.2954 fewer days in the hospital 
(-0.2954, p=0.0215); West region, negatively associated with length of stay where the result 
is 1.01 fewer days in the hospital (-1.0111, p=<0.0001); South region, negatively associated 
with length of stay where it is associated with 0.0588 fewer days in the hospital (-0.05882, 
p<0.0001); small bedsize, negatively associated with 0.7499 fewer days in the hospital (-
0.7499, p=0.0001); number of procedures per physician, positively associated with a 0.0165 
of a day longer length of stay (0.0165, p<0.001); and receiving the procedure after the benefit 
expansion, positively associated with a 0.2888 of a day longer length of stay (0.2888, 
p=0.0001). 
 
 
Table 9 
 
Length of Stay –Short Run with Physician Variable 
 
Variable Estimate Chi Square P-Value 
INTERCEPT 1.2603 13.28 0.0003* 
AGE -0.0044 0.94 0.3317 
FEMALE 0.1809 6.26 0.0123* 
INCOME < $44,999 0.0045 0.00 0.9504 
MEDICAID 0.3420 3.03 0.0817 
MEDICARE 0.3462 13.51 0.0002* 
 
Table 9 Continued 
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Variable Estimate Chi Square P-Value 
ERSOURCE 1.9383 5.13 0.0235* 
ERTYPE -0.9464 1.49 0.2224 
CHARLSON 0.0672 0.87 0.3522 
ANYCOMP 0.2211 1.65 0.1989 
MIDWEST -0.2954 5.29 0.0215* 
WEST -1.0111 15.76 <0.0001* 
SOUTH -0.5882 17.85 <0.0001* 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 0.0763 0.32 0.5732 
BEDSIZE SMALL -0.7499 14.81 0.0001* 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM -0.2624 2.62 0.1053 
TOTAL HOSP DISCH -0.0000 27.49 <0.0001* 
# DBS PER HOSP -0.0000 0.00 0.9931 
# DBS PER PHYSICIAN 0.0165 41.93 <0.0001* 
MEDREIMB 0.2888 10.68 0.0001* 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE:  n=460 
 
 
 The fourth outcomes model is the log of total charges.  Table 10 reveals the results 
for this model in the short run full sample.  Several variables were determinants of total 
charges. First, contrary to intuition, increased age was negatively associated with total 
charges where a one year change in age was associated with a 0.00769 decrease in the log of 
total charges (-0.00769, p=0.0161). The same negative effect was observed with the total 
number of discharges per hospital where one discharge was associated with a very small 
decrease in the log of total charges (-0.00001101, p<0.001). This later observation may again 
be related to the volume effect discussed in earlier sections of the paper. The remaining six 
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variables were positively related to total charges and placed upward pressure on the log of 
total charges. Individuals who were sicker as defined by the Charlson co-morbidity index 
(0.12757, 0.0224), those admitted through the emergency department (1.21208, p=0.0495) 
and Medicaid beneficiaries (0.50769, 0.0078) were more likely to have high charges 
associated with their treatment program.  Each of these variables may signal a high level of 
patient acuity prior to the procedure. Regional variations were also observed in an 
examination of total charges was conducted. Patients receiving care in the Midwest were 
associated with a 0.2471 increase in log of total charges (0.24718, p=0.0439); and in theWest 
were associated with a 0.8528 increase in the log of total charges (0.85280, p>0.0001) and 
thus all were more likely to have more expenses incurred in their treatment as defined by 
total charges. It is known, however, that total charges may not always be perfectly correlated 
with the total cost of care and are probably inflated in excess of the total actual cost. Patients 
receiving care through a teaching institution were also likely to have greater total charges 
than those receiving care elsewhere where teaching institution was associated with a 0.9586 
increase in log of total charges (0.95688, <0.0001).  
 
Table 10 
 
Log Total Charges –Short Run Full Sample 
 
Variable 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
t-Statistic P-Value 
INTERCEPT 10.14 40.96 <0.0001* 
AGE -0.00769 -2.41 0.0161* 
FEMALE 0.05881 1.04 0.2966 
 
Table 10 Continued 
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Variable 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
t-Statistic P-Value 
INCOME < $44,999 -0.02737 -0.49 0.6222 
MEDICAID 0.50769 2.67 0.0078* 
MEDICARE 0.06968 1.07 0.2858 
ER SOURCE 1.21208 1.97 0.0495* 
ER TYPE -0.44346 -0.82 0.4115 
CHARLSON 0.12757 2.29 0.0224* 
ANY COMPLICATIONS 0.06182 0.56 0.5728 
MIDWEST 0.24718 2.02 0.0439* 
WEST 0.85280 6.46 <0.0001* 
SOUTH -0.02885 -0.23 0.8187 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 0.95688 11.3 <0.0001* 
BEDSIZE SMALL 0.22712 1.45 0.1481 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM -0.16277 -1.23 0.2175 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP -0.00001101 -3.96 <0.0001* 
# DBS PER HOSP 0.00090568 1.75 0.0805 
MEDREIMB -0.05454 -1.00 0.3186 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE:  n=911 
 
 
Table 11 reveals the results for the log of total charges model in the short term when 
physician influence is also considered. All of the variables included in the prior analysis with 
the exception of co-morbidities as measured by the Charlston index. In contrast to the prior 
evaluation, other factors seem to be related to overall total charges. Patients receiving care in 
small hospitals were associated with a 0.8720 decrease in log of total charges (-0.87200, 
p<0.001) and in medium hospitals were associated with 0.4908 decrease in log of total 
charges (-0.49083, p=0.0030) and thus these hospitals were less likely to incur additional 
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charges compared to large hospitals. The number of DBS procedures per hospital were 
associated with a 0.0073 decrease in log of total charges (0.00738, p<0.0001); and number of 
DBS procedures per doctor were associated with a 0.0087 increase in log of total charges 
(0.00870, p=0.008) and thus were both positively associated with total charges which could 
indicate adverse selection of a sicker patient population for those hospitals and physicians 
who had reputations for doing DBS procedures. Total charges, in 2003 dollars, after the 
benefit expansion were also higher (0.19985, p=0.0240).    
 
 
Table 11 
 
Log Total Charges –Short Run With Physician Variable 
 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-Statistic P-Value 
INTERCEPT 9.49785 25.92 <0.0001* 
AGE -0.01008 -2.17 0.0306* 
FEMALE 0.07764 1.00 0.3155 
INCOME < $44,999 0.07651 1.02 0.3093 
MEDICAID 0.36130 1.68 0.0936 
MEDICARE -0.03356 -0.36 0.7204 
ER SOURCE 3.69375 4.08 <0.0001* 
ER TYPE -1.82052 -2.26 0.0242* 
CHARLSON 0.13320 1.73 0.0846 
ANY COMPLICATIONS 0.24265 1.21 0.2285 
MIDWEST 0.45576 2.93 0.0035* 
WEST 0.57981 2.29 0.0227* 
SOUTH 0.19538 1.20 0.2299 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 1.98962 13.84 <0.0001* 
 
Table 11 Continued 
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Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-Statistic P-Value 
BEDSIZE SMALL -0.87200 -4.15 <0.0001* 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM -0.49083 -2.98 0.0030* 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP -0.00003660 -8.63 <0.0001* 
# DBS PER HOSP 0.00738 5.30 <0.0001* 
# DBS PER PHYSICIAN 0.00870 3.39 0.0008* 
MEDREIMB 0.19985 2.26 0.0240* 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE:  n=911 
 
 
 
Long Term Evaluation 
 
 
The prior analysis looked at changes in key variables 1 year before and after the 
implementation of the NCD. The research question evaluated was to determine if patient 
demographic characteristics, hospital characteristics, physician characteristics, or patient 
outcome variables changed in the short run. Short-term patient outcomes were defined by 
complication rates, average length of hospital stay, disposition to care settings other than 
home and total charges in 2003 Dollars.  
These overall study objectives are revisited in the following section of the paper. The 
primarily difference between the prior work and that which is about to be described can be 
found in the fundamental assumption that sometimes short term changes in patient outcomes 
are not consistent with the outcomes seen in the long term. Short term changes may be more 
or less positive as new hospitals and physicians enter into the market with less experience in 
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conducting the procedures. The long term evaluation, which excludes the period assessed 
during the short term, could give a more reflective assessment of changes in patient outcomes 
when short term variances are removed.  
As before, univariate statistics were used to evaluate any variations in the sample 
population before and after implementation of the NCD. Those results are presented in Table 
12.  While males in their middle sixties were still most likely to have DBS, the acuity of the 
patients receiving the procedure had significantly changes over time (p < 0.0001) and more 
procedures were being funded by Medicare and fewer procedures funded by private insurers 
(p < 0.0010). While regional variations did not reveal themselves to be important factors 
when comparing pre long term data to post long term data, there were significantly fewer 
cases performed in the long-term post period compared to the long-term pre period. This 
effect is not unexpected given the guidance provided into the NCD as to the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria that would be used to support the funding decision. In the longer term, 
complication rates improved (p = 0.0267) and the average length of stay declined (0.0065).   
 
 
Table 12 
 
Long Term Pre-/Post- Analysis Subsample 
 
Variable 
Pre 
(N=413) 
Post 
(N=720) P 
Value N or 
Mean 
% or 
SD 
N or 
Mean 
% or 
SD 
Patient Characteristics 
Female 136 32.93 247 34.31 0.6375 
AGE 62.605 11.025 64.603 10.321 0.0020* 
CHARLSON 0.1477 0.4351 0.2903 0.5757 <0.0001* 
Income <$45,000 198 49.62 312 44.70 0.1156 
PAYER     0.0010* 
Medicare 240 58.11 490 68.06  
Medicaid 11 2.66 14 1.94  
 
Table 12 Continued 
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Variable 
Pre 
(N=413) 
Post 
(N=720) P 
Value N or 
Mean 
% or 
SD 
N or 
Mean 
% or 
SD 
Patient Characteristics 
Private/incl HMO 153 37.05 196 27.22  
Other Insurance***      
Admission & Hospital Characteristics 
Admission Source***      
Emergency Room***      
Another Hosp***      
Long Term Care & Other***      
Ambulatory 401 97.80 688 97.31  
Admission type      
Emergency***      
Urgent 13 3.15 30 4.17  
Elective 396 95.88 678 94.17  
Region of Country     <0.001* 
Northeast 62 15.01 112 15.56  
Midwest 93 22.52 79 10.97  
South 174 42.13 350 48.61  
West 84 20.34 179 24.86  
Teaching Hospital 331 80.15 566 78.61 0.5405 
No. of Beds     <0.001* 
Small  36 8.72 24 3.33  
Medium ***      
Admission & Hospital Characteristics 
Large (x-y beds) 368 89.10 623 86.53  
Hospital Discharges 30559 12498 35393 18669 <0.0001* 
# Procedures/Hospital 50.867 29.662 40.165 26.696 <0.0001* 
Mean Total Charges 44,671 30,811 44,415 30,811 0.8850 
Physician Characteristics 
Number of Procedures/MD 29.777 17.91 23.607 17.685 <0.001* 
Patient Outcomes 
Complications 35 8.47 37 5.14 0.0267* 
Discharge to Home 381 92.25 664 92.22 0.9937 
Average Length of Stay 2.8281 6.2835 1.9458 2.5059 0.0065* 
denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
***denotes redaction to comply with HCUP requirements 
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Determinants of Short vs Long Term Complication Rates  
 
 
One of the research questions originally proposed for the existing endeavor is whether 
variations were observed in the short run compared to the long run. Each of these tables 
below represents variations observed across time. The results of the long run statistical 
analysis are provided in the Appendices for reader review.  Table 13 provides of summary of 
the variations observed over time specific to the analysis of changes in complication rates 
and key determinants of those complications. The second and third columns compare short 
term and long term analysis when physician variables are not included. Columns four and 
five should the outcomes of the results in physician variables are incorporated into the 
evaluation. 
 
 
Table 13 
 
Short Run vs Long Run Complications With and Without Physician Variance 
 
 SR Without 
MD 
LR Without 
MD 
SR With MD  LR With 
MD 
AGE     
FEMALE     
INCOME <$44,999     
MEDICAID   **  
MEDICARE     
ERTYPE     
CHARLSON ** **  ** 
MIDWEST ** ** ** ** 
SOUTH   ** ** 
 
Table 13 Continued 
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 SR Without 
MD 
LR Without 
MD 
SR With MD  LR With 
MD 
TEACHING HOSPITAL     
BEDSIZE MEDIUM  **   
# TOTAL HOSP DISCH.   **  
#DBS PROC IN HOSP **    
# Procedures/Physician     
MEDREIMB  **  ** 
** denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
 
 
 
Similarities were observed when comparing the short and long term. As would be 
anticipated patients with higher levels of acuity tend to have more complications with any 
procedure. While the improvements in care in Midwest institutions may be superior from a 
statistical standpoint, the actually improvement of Midwest institutions compared to the care 
provided in other region of the national may be clinically less meaningful. Addition research, 
however, to examine the geographic variations observed in this evaluation deserve merit of 
future consideration.  
 
Determinants of Short vs Long Term Discharge Disposition Types 
 
 
Most cases of DBS are done on patients who are admitted to the hospital voluntarily 
and whose disposition is to home for recovery. The comparison outline evaluates whether the 
short term disposition rates and significantly different than the long term rates. From a 
theoretical standpoint, Medicare funding post-acute care for beneficiaries and therefore in the 
Medicare population it is more likely that patients will be discharge to post acute care 
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settings other than home. Table 14 presents these comparisons.  The data used to populate the 
table can be found either in a prior section of the paper or in the Appendices. 
 
 
Table 14 
 
Short Run vs Long Run Disposition Rates With and Without Physician Variance 
 
 SR Without 
MD 
LR Without 
MD 
SR With 
MD  
LR With 
MD 
AGE  **  ** 
FEMALE  **  ** 
INCOME < $44,999     
MEDICAID ** ** ** ** 
MEDICARE ** ** **  
CHARLSON ** **   
ANYCOMP ** **  ** 
MIDWEST     
WEST **    
SOUTH   **  
TEACHING HOSP     
BEDSIZE SMALL  **   
BEDSIZE MEDIUM    ** 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP    ** 
# DBS / HOSP   **  
# Procedures/Physician   **  
MEDREIMB   **  
** denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Across both time periods, payer type is a significant determinant of whether a patient is 
discharged home or not. Beyond this one finding, no other significant finding are 
immediately observable in the data presented related to discharge status.  
 
Determinants of Short vs Long Term Length of Stay 
 
Table 15 presents data related to variations between the average length of stay for 
patients undergoing DBS for PD. Appendix F and G provide data related to long term 
outcomes and short term outcome data are presented in prior sections of the paper, but 
summarized below.  
 
 
Table 15 
 
Short Run vs Long Run Length of Stay With and Without Physician Variance 
 
 SR Without 
MD 
LR Without 
MD 
SR With 
MD  
LR With 
MD 
AGE ** ** ** ** 
FEMALE  **   
INCOME < $44,999     
MEDICAID   **  
MEDICARE **  **  
ER TYPE     
CHARLSON    ** 
ANY COMPLICATIONS ** **  ** 
MIDWEST ** ** ** ** 
WEST ** ** **  
SOUTH  ** ** ** 
 
Table 15 Continued 
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 SR Without 
MD 
LR Without 
MD 
SR With 
MD  
LR With 
MD 
TEACHING HOSPITAL  **  ** 
BEDSIZE SMALL ** ** ** ** 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM ** **  ** 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP ** ** **  
# DBS PER HOSP  **  ** 
#DBS per MD   ** ** 
MEDREIMB  ** ** ** 
** denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
 
 
Several factors were consistent with respect to increase the patient‘s length of stay in 
both the short run and the longer term. Such factors included items such as complication rates 
and patient age.  
 
Determinants of Short vs Long Estimated Expenditures per Procedure 
 
 
Table 16 presents data related to variations between the average expenditure for 
patient services in both the short and long term. While not ideal, expenditures are denoted in 
terms of patient charges. Actual costs per hospital stay are expected to be lower than the 
amounts provided below.   
Factors in both the short run and long run that were related to changes in total hospital 
expenditures, defined as charges, included the patient presenting status to the hospital, 
hospitals located in western regions, teaching affiliation and bedside. Medicare 
reimbursement was also a consistent factor influencing the variations in patient expenditures 
in both times periods. 
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Table 16 
 
Short Run vs Long Run Total Hospital Charges With and Without Physician Variance 
 
 SR Without 
MD 
LR Without 
MD 
SR With 
MD  
LR With 
MD 
AGE **  **  
FEMALE     
INCOME < $44,999     
MEDICAID   **  
MEDICARE     
ER TYPE ** ** **  
CHARLSON     
ANY COMPLICATIONS   **  
MIDWEST **    
WEST ** ** ** ** 
SOUTH   **  
TEACHING HOSPITAL ** **  ** 
BEDSIZE SMALL ** ** ** ** 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM **   ** 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP **   ** 
# DBS PER HOSP **  **  
#DBS per MD     
MEDREIMB ** **  ** 
** denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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CHAPTER 5 
HIERARCHICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
Hierarchical Modeling of Nested Data 
 
When patients or providers can be associated with a given hospital, the patient and/or 
provided is sometimes termed to be nested with the hospital. This can proposal some unique 
challenges to tradition statistical models. In light of this consideration, the author chose to 
summarize findings across hierarchical models that were used to assess key determinants of 
patient outcomes while taking into accounting that nesting is most likely occurring in the 
available data source. Several other reports of individuals statistical output when hierarchical 
models are apply to the short term sample with and without physician influence are available 
for the readers review in the Appendices of this research report. Table 17 shows descriptive 
statistics over four time periods with the time periods annualized for comparison.  The 
information presented immediately below focuses on trends observed in the hierarchical 
models over time.   
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Table 17 
 
Full Sample Annualized Frequencies and Means over Four Time Periods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17 Continued 
 
PreLong PreShort PostShort PostLong 
Variable  
Freq 
% or 
Mean 
 
Freq 
% or 
Mean 
 
Freq 
% or 
Mean 
 
Freq 
% or 
Mean 
Sex              
     Male 200.00  67.49  426 94.25 294 65.33 272 67.24 
     Female 96.33  32.51  26 5.75 156 34.67 133 32.76 
              
Income              
< $44,999  158.00  53.32  281 62.17 287 62.53 258 61.53 
> $45,000 138.33  46.68  171 37.83 172 37.47 161 38.47 
         
`Primary Payor             
     Medicare 78.33  60.18  287  63.50 291 63.40 278 68.82 
     Other 118.00  39.82  165 36.51 159 34.64 127 31.18 
         
Region for Hosp            
     NEast 28.00  9.45  24 5.31 31 6.75 47 11.15 
     Midwest 74.00  24.97  162 35.84 70 15.25 47 11.15 
     South 96.33  32.51  135 30.00 212 46.19 161 38.40 
     West 98.00  33.07  131 28.98 146 31.81 165 39.29 
            
Teaching Hosp          
     Non 
     Teaching 
 
38.67  
 
13.05  90 19.91 61 13.29 61 14.46 
     Teaching 257.67  86.95  362 80.09 398 86.71 358 85.54 
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PreLong PreShort PostShort PostLong 
Variable  
Freq 
% or 
Mean 
 
Freq 
% or 
Mean 
 
Freq 
% or 
Mean 
 
Freq 
% or 
Mean 
Any 
Complications 
  
 
 
    
  
     False 275.33  92.91  426 94.25 429 93.46 398 95.10 
     True 21.00  7.09  26 5.75 30 6.54 21 4.90 
              
Discharge Loc.            
     STC/LTC/ 
     Died 
                 
24.67  
                   
8.32  
 
35 7.76 52 11.40 33 7.77 
     Home 271.67  91.68  416 92.24 404 88.60 386 92.22 
           
Age 62.55  10.62  62.88 9.72 63.49 9.97 64 9.92 
Charlson  0.16  0.46  0.2079 0.46 0.2352 0.53 0.26 0.54 
(Range 0 = low 
severity to 6 = 
high severity) 
   
        
# Disch/Hosp 26030  10991.87  33531 16836.86 29552 14947.95 30618 15137.79 
#DBS/Hosp 83  59.17  99.73 54.35 98.82 66.87 59 56.35 
LOS 2.66 2.66 2.38 2.47 2.81 4.69 2.17 2.99 
Total 
Charges/Patient 43361.87 
          
26704.56  46709.03 31336.97 45628.02 25524.22 48196.61 29463.00 
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Determinants of Complication Rates 
 
Table 18 describes the factors indicated as being statistically significant determinants 
of complication rates when the data were assessed using hierarchical logistic regression 
across all four time periods: prelong (January 1, 1999 through March 31, 2002); preshort 
(April 1, 2002 through March 31, 2003); postshort (April 1, 2003 through March 31, 2004); 
and postlong (April 1, 2004 through December 31, 2007).   This data reflect the sample 
population that does not include physician variables. 
 
 
Table 18 
 
Complications—Full Sample with Four Time Periods 
 
Hierarchical Logistic Model 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
P-Value 
INTERCEPT   0.0005 
AGE 0.993 0.976—1.010 0.4306 
FEMALE 1.263 0.928—1.719 0.1378 
INCOME < $44,999 0.923 0.668—1.276 0.6295 
MEDICAID 2.550 1.082—6.009 0.0323* 
MEDICARE 1.161 0.800—1.685 0.4320 
ER SOURCE 3.787 0.958—14.960 0.0575 
ER TYPE 1.449 0.567—3.708 0.4384 
 
Table 18 Continued 
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Variable Odds Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
P-Value 
CHARLSON 1.624 1.286—2.050 <0.0001* 
MIDWEST 0.296 0.159—0.552 0.0001* 
SOUTH  0.434 0.246—0.766 0.0040* 
WEST 0.505 0.291—0.875 0.0148* 
TEACHING 
HOSPITAL  
1.155 0.663—2.014 0.6111 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM  1.781 0.917—3.461 0.0886 
# DBS PER HOSP  1.003 1.000—1.006 0.0603 
TOTAL DISCH / 
HOSP 
1.000 1.000—1.000 0.3850 
PRESHORT 0.776 0.467—1.288 0.3264 
POSTSHORT 0.724 0.455—1.152 0.1731 
POSTLONG 0.817 0.508—1.313 0.4040 
    
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE: n=3370 
 
 
Patient specific characteristics did not appear to be associated with changes in the 
patients complication rates other than co-morbidity levels as reported by the Charlson index 
where a one point increase in the Charlson was 1.624 times more likely to have 
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complications (OR 1.624, p<0.0001). Variations in complication rates were observed across 
geographical regions of the country and tended to be about 70% less likely in the Midwest  
(OR 0.296, p=0.0001) and 57% less likely in the South South (OR 0.434, p=0.0040). 
Medicaid beneficiaries also tend to have more complications where Medicaid beneficiaries 
wehre 2.550 times more likely to have complications (OR 2.550, p=0.0323). The results of 
the analysis do not change dramatically when physician specific variables are included in the 
analysis (Table 19).  
 
 
Table 19 
Complications—Subsample with Four Time Periods 
Hierarchical Logistic Model 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
P-Value 
INTERCEPT   0.2803 
AGE 0.981 0.957—1.005 0.1164 
FEMALE 1.574 1.001—2.475 0.0495* 
INCOME < $44,999 0.867 0.538—1.397 0.5577 
MEDICAID 3.633 1.197—11.029 0.0228* 
MEDICARE 1.732 0.966—3.105 0.0652 
ER SOURCE 0.986 0.112—8.670 0.9900 
ER TYPE 2.025 0.408—10.052 0.3880 
CHARLSON 1.654 1.165—2.348 0.0049* 
MIDWEST 0.317 0.143—0.705 0.0048* 
SOUTH  0.294 0.143—0.603 0.0009* 
WEST 0.626 0.304—1.288 0.2029 
 
Table 19 Continued 
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Variable Odds Ratio 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
P-Value 
TEACHING HOSPITAL  0.910 0.401—2.065 0.8212 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM  1.720 0.632—4.686 0.2884 
# DBS PER HOSP  0.993 0.983—1.003 0.1775 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP 1.000 1.000—1.000 0.0402* 
NUMDOC 0.994 0.980—1.009 0.4502 
PRESHORT 0.470 0.203—1.087 0.0776 
POSTSHORT 0.967 0.421—2.225 0.9377 
POSTLONG 0.382 0.164—0.889 0.0256* 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE: n=1593 
 
 
 
Determinants of Discharge Disposition 
 
Models specific to assessing determinants of discharge disposition using hierarchical 
modeling techniques are presented in Tables 20 and 21. Eight determinants of discharge 
disposition were reported for the total sample not including physician specific influences 
(Table 21).   
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Table 20 
 
Non Death Disposition - Full Sample With Four Time Periods 
 
Hierarchical Logistic Multivariate Model 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
INTERCEPT   <0.001 
AGE 1.038 1.020—1.055 <0.001* 
FEMALE 1.172 0.894—1.535 0.2502 
INCOME < $44,999 0.717 0.540—0.952 0.0216* 
MEDICAID 7.345 3.485—15.481 <0.001* 
MEDICARE 1.983 1.338—2.940 0.0007* 
ERSOURCE 5.367 1.525—18.886 0.0089* 
ERTYPE 0.970 0.407—2.315 0.9458 
CHARLSON 1.502 1.223—1.844 0.0001* 
MIDWEST 0.946 0.527—1.697 0.8520 
SOUTH 0.689 0.384—1.238 0.2129 
WEST 0.556 0.312—0.993 0.0473* 
ANYCOMP 3.388 2.269—5.059 <0.0001* 
HTEACH 1.259 0.777—2.040 0.3489 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 1.062 0.592—1.905 0.8408 
# DBS PER HOSP 1.000 0.996—0.003 0.8400 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP  1.000 1.000—1.000 0.1595 
PRESHORT 0.908 0.565—1.458 0.6892 
POSTSHORT 0.681 0.459—1.010 0.0563* 
POSTLONG 1.268 0.828—1.942 0.2749 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE: n=3370 
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Like the results observe in the prior evaluations, discharge disposition is likely to be 
influenced by payer type.  For example, Medicaid beneficiaries are 7.345 times more likely 
to be discharged to extended care compared to private payers (OR 7.345, p<0.0001); and 
Medicare beneficiaries are 1.083 more likely to be discharged to extended care compared to 
private payers (OR 1.983, p=0.0007). Also, like before, patients were 5.367 times more likely 
to be discharged to post acute care setting when the Emergency Department was the 
admission source (OR 5.367, p=0.0089); and 1.502 times more likely to be discharged to 
post acute care when  the patient had more co-morbidities upon admission (OR 1.502, 
p=0.0001). Unlike data presented before, patients were also 1.038 times more likely to be 
discharged to longer term care if they were older (OR 1.038, p<0.001) and about 29% less 
likely to be discharged to longer term care if they had income less than $45,000 (OR 0.717, 
p=0.0216).  
Table 20 describes the results for the subsample for non-death disposition using four 
time periods.  There are four determinants for complications:  more likely to be older (OR 
1.046, p=0.0008); more likely to have Medicaid as payer(OR 10.349, p<0.0001); more likely 
to have been admitted through the ER (OR 12.724, p=0.0101); and more likely to have 
experienced complications (OR 4.013, p<0.0001). 
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Table 21 
 
Non Death Disposition – Subsample with Four Time Periods 
 
Hierarchical Logistic Multivariate Model 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
INTERCEPT   <0.001 
AGE 1.046 1.019—1.074 0.0008* 
FEMALE 1.478 0.986—2.217 0.0586 
INCOME < $44,999 0.827 0.542—1.262 0.3777 
MEDICAID 10.349 3.972—26.963 <0.0001* 
MEDICARE 1.245 0.693—2.236 0.4626 
ERSOURCE 12.724 1.832—88.391 0.0101* 
ERTYPE 0.524 0.071—3.867 0.5263 
CHARLSON 1.247 0.894—1.738 0.1936 
MIDWEST 1.360 0.598—3.095 0.4629 
SOUTH 0.591 0.266—1.316 0.1976 
WEST 0.887 0.388—2.024 0.7749 
ANYCOMP 4.013 2.189—7.358 <0.0001* 
HTEACH 0.993 0.496—1.987 0.9843 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 0.602 0.233—1.556 0.2949 
# DBS PER HOSP 0.993 0.983—1.003 0.1528 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP  1.000 1.000—1.000 0.2303 
NUMDOC 1.009 0.993—1.025 0.2579 
PRESHORT 0.929 0.448—1.927 0.8432 
POSTSHORT 0.725 0.382—1.376 0.3258 
POSTLONG 1.520 0.758—3.049 0.2382 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE: n=1593 
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Determinants of Length of Stay 
 
Tables 22 and 23 describe the outcome length of stay (LOS) using a hierarchical 
negative binomial model.  In table 23, there are five determinants of LOS in the full sample:  
age, where a one year change in age is associated with a 0.0095 of a day longer hospital stay 
(0.009513, p<0.0001); ER as source of admission, where this is associated with a 0.7274 of a 
day longer length of stay (0.7274, 0.0013); having surgery in the West is associated with a 
0.3296 of a day shorter length of stay compared to the Northeast (-0.3296, p<0.001); the 
presence of any complications, where this is associated with a 0.7523 of a day increase in 
length of stay (0.7523, p<0.001); and having the surgery in the preshort period, 12 months 
prior to the benefit expansion, is associated with a 0.1215 of a day shorter length of stay (-
0.1215, p=0.0486). 
Table 23 describes LOS when physician influences are included. In addition 
geographical variation were observed with shorter lengths of stay in the South, which was 
associated with 0.3742 of a day shorter hospital stay compared to the Northeast (-0.3742, 
p=0.0305) and the West, which was associated with 0.4115 of a day shorter hospital stay than 
the Northeast (-0.4115, p<0.001). As before, complication rates also influence length of stay. 
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Table 22 
 
Length of Stay - Full Sample with Four Time Periods 
 
Hierarchical Negative Binomial Multivariate Model 
 
Variable Estimate t Value P-Value 
INTERCEPT 0.2710 1.13 0.2612 
AGE 0.009513 4.80 <0.0001* 
FEMALE 0.03997 1.15 0.2515 
INCOME < $44,999 -0.06635 -1.85 0.0645 
MEDICAID 0.2212 1.81 0.0703 
MEDICARE 0.05691 1.36 0.1735 
ERSOURCE 0.7274 3.22 0.0013* 
ERTYPE -0.2302 -1.62 0.1052 
CHARLSON 0.05888 1.89 0.0584 
MIDWEST -0.1792 -1.00 0.3174 
SOUTH -0.2596 -1.48 0.1390 
WEST -0.3296 -1.85 0.0644 
ANYCOMP 0.7523 12.39 <0.0001* 
HTEACH 0.1397 1.11 0.2675 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM  0.07601 0.69 0.4875 
#DBS PER HOSP 0.000872 0.67 0.5031 
TOTAL 
DISCHARGES 
0.00000117 -0.35 0.7298 
PRESHORT -0.1215 -1.97 0.0486* 
POSTSHORT -0.1432 -2.47 0.0135* 
POSTLONG -0.05430 0.91 0.3646 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE: n=3370 
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Table 23 
 
Length of Stay –Subsample with Four Time Periods 
 
Hierarchical Negative Binomial Multivariate Model 
 
Variable Estimate t Value P-Value 
INTERCEPT 0.3883 1.36 0.1779 
AGE 0.009786 3.23 0.0012* 
FEMALE 0.05241 0.98 0.3264 
INCOME < $44,999 -0.01443 -0.27 0.7884 
MEDICAID 0.1636 0.96 0.3367 
MEDICARE 0.06296 0.95 0.3407 
ERSOURCE 0.6926 2.10 0.0357 
ERTYPE -0.2661 -0.93 0.3518 
CHARLSON 0.07150 1.49 0.1358 
MIDWEST -0.2462 -1.33 0.1831 
SOUTH  -0.3742 -2.17 0.0305* 
WEST -0.4115 -2.13 0.0332* 
ANYCOMP 0.7862 8.25 <0.001* 
TEACHING HOSPITAL  0.08314 0.61 0.5421 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM  0.05620 0.41 0.6807 
# DBS PER HOSP  -0.00263 -1.22 0.2208 
TOTAL HOSP DISCH  .00000251 -0.72 0.4707 
NUMDOC 0.004778 1.95 0.0516 
PRESHORT -0.1801 -1.95 0.0519 
POSTSHORT -0.1334 -1.42 0.1556 
POSTLONG -0.06105 0.64 0.5245 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE: n=1593 
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Determinants of Hospital Charges 
 
Tables 24 and 25 describe the outcome log of total charges in the full sample and the 
subsample over four time periods.  Table 24 reveals three determinants of log of total 
charges:  Medicaid as the payer, where this was associated with 0.2241 increase in log of 
total charges (0.2241, p=0.0008); surgery in the West, which was associated with a 0.4297 
increase in log of total charges (0.4297, p=0.0087); and teaching hospital status, which was 
associated with 0.1930 increase in log of total charges (0.1930, p=0.0318). Table 25 
describes the outcome log of total charges in the subsample and reveals four determinants 
that were positively associated with total charges: Medicaid as payer, which was associated 
with a 0.3365 increase in log of total charges compared to private payers (0.3365, p=0.0003); 
surgery in the Midwest, which was associated with 0.06533 increase in log of total charges 
compared to the Northeast (0.06533, p=0.0172); surgery in the West, which was associated 
with a 0.5494 increase in log of total charges (0.5494, p=0.0391); and number of DBS 
procedures per physician, where one procedure was positively associated with a 0.0056 
increase in long of total charges (0.005611, p=0.0002). 
It is interesting to note that for three of the models, the intercept was not significant 
(complications in the subsample, length of stay in the full sample, length of stay in the 
subsample).  Part of this may be the underlying construct of the data:  discontinuous hospital 
data.  Or, it could be that there is substantial stochastic error—which, ironically, the author 
was trying to decrease by using the hierarchy. 
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Table 24 
 
Log Total Charges Full Sample with Four Time Periods 
 
Hierarchical Ordinary Least Squares Multivariate Model 
 
Variable 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
t-Statistic P-Value 
INTERCEPT 10.2161 55.28 <0.001 
AGE -0.00141 -1.30 0.1935 
FEMALE -0.02691 -1.37 0.1708 
INCOME < $44,999 -0.01849 -0.93 0.3516 
MEDICAID 0.2241 3.34 0.0008* 
MEDICARE 0.03176 1.38 0.1667 
ER SOURCE 0.1225 0.86 0.3923 
ER TYPE 0.004741 0.06 0.9513 
CHARLSON 0.02932 1.61 0.1078 
MIDWEST 0.05098 0.32 0.0752 
SOUTH  0.1320 0.84 0.4027 
WEST 0.4297 2.63 0.0087* 
ANYCOMP -0.02787 -0.71 0.4787 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 0.1930 2.15 0.0318* 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM -0.06606 -1.04 0.2967 
# DBS PER HOSP  -0.00037 -0.29 0.7715 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP 0.000000997 0.39 0.6984 
PRESHORT 0.01443 0.40 0.6898 
POSTSHORT 0.04545 1.33 0.1847 
POSTLONG 0.04646 1.32 0.1865 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE: n=3370 
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Table 25 
 
Log Total Charges -Subsample with Four Time Periods 
 
Hierarchical Ordinary Least Squares Multivariate Model 
 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-Statistic P-Value 
INTERCEPT 10.1633 36.24 <0.0001 
AGE -0.00282 -1.70 0.0901 
FEMALE -0.00348 -0.12 0.9065 
INCOME < $44,999 0.000899 0.03 0.9757 
MEDICAID 0.3365 3.62 0.0003* 
MEDICARE 0.02923 0.81 0.4159 
ER SOURCE 0.3067 1.40 0.1604 
ER TYPE -0.1642 -0.94 0.3456 
CHARLSON 0.06533 2.38 0.0172* 
MIDWEST 0.08437 0.34 0.7324 
SOUTH  0.2424 1.04 0.2997 
WEST 0.5494 2.06 0.0391* 
ANYCOMP -0.07972 -1.30 0.1922 
TEACHING HOSPITAL  0.1144 0.89 0.3716 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM  -0.1319 -1.42 0.1546 
# DBS PER HOSP  -0.00208 -0.76 0.4485 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP  0.000001143 0.34 0.7376 
# DBS PER PHYSICIAN  0.005611 3.70 0.0002* 
PRESHORT 0.00076 -0.01 0.9887 
POSTSHORT 0.07408 1.34 0.1799 
POSTLONG 0.03166 0.56 0.5762 
    
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
NOTE:  reference variable for region is the Northeast; reference for bedsize is bedsize 
large; reference for payers is private pay. 
NOTE: n=1593 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
National Coverage Decisions implemented by CMS occur after extensive deliberation 
as to the costs and benefits that may occur to beneficiaries. With many NCDs either pilot 
programs are run to assesses such benefits or the NCD is implemented with subsequent 
evaluation of targeted outcomes assessed at a later date. One NCD implemented in 2003 
expanded coverage to patients suffering from Parkinson‘s Disease who may benefit from 
Deep Brain Stimulation as part of the ongoing management of their disease. To the best 
knowledge of the author, no economic or clinical assessment as this decision has been 
reported in the literature. The effort presented in this work sought to address this gap in the 
literature.  
These issues are important to examining whether health policy goals have been met 
because failing to recognize these complexities could lead to an incorrect assessment of the 
success or failure of the benefit expansion. In particular, surgically implantable devices in 
chronic, progressive disease states pose special problems that must be addressed. Failure to 
recognize and account for these issues can lead to incorrect conclusions in program 
assessment.  This may be of increasing interest as DBS is being developed for more common 
diseases (such as depression), and this will put more patients, hospitals, physicians, and 
policymakers in the position of arguing for or against national coverage. 
As discussed throughout this document, if a policy-maker were to only look at the 
initial expenses and outcomes of DBS surgery for Parkinson‘s disease, a grim picture of 
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poorer outcomes and higher expenses might be observed. But this may be temporary. Over 
time, the effects of sicker patients and inexperienced facilities or surgeons diminishes and the 
more accurate effect of the policy on inpatient outcomes would be revealed.  In part, this was 
confirmed by this study as outcomes worsened in the short term, and experienced some 
improvements in the long term. 
 
Short Term and Long Term Descriptive Results  
Full Sample and Subsample 
 
 
The short term full sample revealed four variables that differed in the short term pre and post 
periods:  region, teaching status, bedsize, and number of discharges.  Generally, these are 
consistent with the hypotheses.  That is, more or different hospitals began offering the 
procedure, and many of those were teaching hospitals.  A greater percentage of hospitals in 
the post period were smaller.  The number of discharges per hospital went down in the post 
period, which is consistent with smaller hospitals beginning to offer the procedure.   
 The short term subsample is largely consistent with differences shown above for 
region, teaching status, bedsize, and number of discharges.  However, this sample shows that 
the post period number of procedures per hospital is lower whereas this was not significant in 
the full sample—although numerically the number of procedures was lower—it is not a large 
magnitude.  Additionally, the subsample offers a variable not available in the full sample and 
that is the physician volume.   This sample reveals that the mean number of procedures per 
physician is lower in the post period.  This is consistent with more physicians entering into 
the DBS field thus putting downward pressure on the mean number of procedures per 
physician. 
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 The variable for co-morbidity burden did not differ pre and post as expected, although 
in both samples the burden is numerically higher in the post period, although not 
significantly.  Age also did not differ pre and post in either sample, although both samples 
showed numerically higher ages in the post period, which were not significant. 
 The long term full sample revealed 11 variables that differed pre and post:  income 
(lower income post); payer, (greater percentage of Medicare post and smaller percentage of 
private payer post); more procedures in the south post; more medium sized hospitals and 
fewer large hospitals post; more complications post; older post; higher co-morbidity burden 
post; more hospital discharges post; fewer procedures per hospital post; and shorter length of 
stay post.  
 The long term subsample was largely consistent with the full sample except that 
income, admission source, and admission type no longer showed differences.  All others 
were consistent with the full sample in direction and significance.  Additionally, the 
subsample provides an additional variable, physician volume.  This variable differs with 
fewer procedures per physician in the post period.  This is consistent with the view that 
newer physicians would be attracted to the procedure, and they would do fewer procedures.   
 In general, it was expected that the long term analyses would reveal few differences.  
Instead, patients appear to remain older and sicker throughout the long term post period—
probably due to the skewed age of the new Medicare eligible patients.  Additionally, the 
length of stay variable went down over the same period.  This may be due to changes in 
treatment patterns that shortened hospital stays for surgery, in general.  
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Original Specification Multivariate Results 
 
The short term full sample and subsample offer relatively few determinants of 
complications, perhaps because complications are rare in this population.  The largest 
magnitude predictor was in the short term and it was Medicare as the payer, which was over 
10 times more likely to experience complications compared to privately insured.  In general, 
Medicaid is generally for non-working people, and they may be non-working because they 
are disabled or too sick to work.   
The long term full sample for complications reveals a patient is more likely to 
experience complications in the long term pre period.  This was expected because, over time, 
physician and hospital experience may improve outcomes.  The long term subsample, 
determinants included region and bedsize, but also included that the patient was more likely 
to have a higher co-morbidity burden, and less likely to have the procedure after the benefit 
expansion.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that, over time, complication rates would 
drop after the first twelve months. 
The short term full sample and subsample for non-death disposition reveals five 
determinants in the full sample and six determinants in the subsample.  Region was a 
predictor for both samples, although West was significant in the full sample and South was 
significant in the subsample.  The subsample revealed different hospital and physician 
variables to be predictive.  For example, number of DBS procedures per hospital was less 
likely to result in discharge to a long or short term facility.  However number of DBS 
procedures per physician was slightly more likely to be discharged to a long or short term 
facility.  Lastly, if the surgery was performed in the 12 months after the benefit expansion, 
the patient was more likely to be discharged to long or short term care rather than home.  
 96 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that outcomes may be worse in the immediate 12 
months after a benefit expansion. 
In the long run, although there are determinants of non-death disposition, having the 
surgery performed in the post period is no longer significant.  That is, the discharge pattern is 
similar to the long term pre period.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that, in the short 
run, after a benefit expansion, there may be more complications—but that this will subside 
over time. 
For the short term outcome length of stay in the full sample, positive determinants 
included Medicare as payer, co-morbidity burden, teaching hospital status and complications. 
Negative determinants included region and small or medium bedsize.  Having surgery in the 
post period was not associated with longer length of stay as hypothesized.  In the short term 
LOS subsample, bedsize and region continued to be determinants of LOS.  However, in this 
subsample where physician number of procedures is available, the number of procedures per 
physician is positively associated with length of stay, as is having the surgery in the 12 
months after the benefit expansion.  This confirms the hypothesis that outcomes may be 
worse in the immediate post period of a benefit expansion. 
For the long run LOS full sample, surgery in a small or medium sized hospital was 
negatively related to length of stay, and hospital DBS volume was positively related to length 
of stay (although the coefficient was 0.008).  Also, having the surgery in the long run post 
period was negatively related to the LOS.  It was expected that there would be no differences 
between the long term pre and long term post—but long term improvements in technique and 
general trends for shorter hospital periods may have contributed to shorter and shorter stays 
in the long term.  In the long term subsample, DBS per hospital is negatively associated with 
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LOS, and DBS per physician was positively associated with LOS.  As in the full sample, 
surgery in the post period was negatively associated to LOS. 
The fourth outcome variable is log of total charges in 2003 dollars (the year of benefit 
expansion).  In the short term full sample, total discharges per hospital and age were 
negatively associated with the log of total charges.  However, the coefficients were very 
small (-0.00001101 and -0.00769 respectively).  Co-morbidity burden, West and Midwest 
regions (compared to the North East) and teaching hospital status were positively associated 
with log of total charges.  Having surgery in the short term post period was not related to log 
of total charges.  In the subsample, age, teaching hospital, regions, total number of discharges 
remained significant.  However, in the subsample, the number of DBS procedures per 
hospital, the number of DBS procedures per physician, and having the surgery in the short 
term post period were positively associated with the log of total charges.  This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that using constant dollars, surgery would be more expensive in the 
immediate post period. 
In the long term full sample, region, teaching hospital and bedsize continue to be 
significant, and surgery in the post period is positively associated with log of charges.  That 
is, log of total charges continues to rise.  In the long term subsample, the data are broadly 
consistent. 
 
Alternative Specification Hierarchical Results 
 
Because patients are nested within physicians, who are nested within hospitals, it was 
suggested that hierarchical models be tried to more accurately assess the variability that 
hospitals and physicians separately contribute.  The full samples do not have physician 
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number of procedures, so only the hospital can be used as a class.  The subsample has both 
physician ID and hospital ID, so each was to be a class.  However, when attempting the 
physician and hospital as class models in the subsample, the models did not converge 
because the physician class ran out of degrees of freedom.  Investigating this revealed the 
following:  there is not strong correlation between the ID‘s of the pre and post physicians.  
Perhaps because in each state, for each year, a 20% sample is pulled, which is generalizeable 
to the DBS surgery in that state.  But physician ID is unique only by hospital.  So, unless the 
same hospitals are pulled every year, correlation between physician ID suffers which 
increases the number of unique ID‘s (thus using up sample).  This is true for hospital ID as 
well, although to a lesser degree because full samples have many more degrees of freedom to 
accommodate the large number of unique hospitals.   
Additionally, instead of the long run comparisons, it was suggested that a model that 
incorporated contiguous time periods be used.  That is, instead of long term pre vs. long term 
post, develop a model that has four contiguous time periods (long term pre, short term pre, 
short term post, long term post) and use long term pre as the reference category. 
In the complications short run full sample model, determinants were co-morbidity 
burden (increased likelihood); hospital in the Midwest or South (decreased likelihood); and 
total number of DBS procedures per hospital (decreased likelihood).  In the short term 
subsample, only number of DBS procedures per hospital was significant (less likely).  
In the four time-period full sample complications model, there were no significant 
differences due to the timing of the surgery.  In the subsample complications model, the 
postlong period differed from the prelong period in that patients were less likely to 
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experience complications in the long term post period than the long term pre period.  This is 
consistent with the original specification long term results. 
In the non death disposition short run full sample, patients who were older, who had 
Medicaid as payer, or medicare as payer, and had higher co-morbidity burdens were more 
likely to be discharged to long or short term care.  Those having surgery in the West or had 
any complications were more likely to be discharged to home.  In the short run subsample, 
Medicaid and Medicare were again determinants.  However, having the procedure in the 12 
months after the benefit expansion yielded a 4.474 times more likelihood of being discharged 
to a long or short term facility rather than home.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
outcomes in the short post period would be worse. 
In the full sample non death disposition model with four time periods, the post short 
period differs from the pre long period; however, this comparison was not identified in the 
hypotheses in the subsample, there are no time period differences.  These results are 
consistent with the original specification long term results. 
In the length of stay short run full sample, Medicare as payer, co-morbidity burden, 
and presence of complications were significant.  In the subsample, Medicare was again 
significant.  However, having the procedure in the post period was associated with a longer 
length of stay.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that outcomes in the short post period 
would be worse. 
In the full sample length of stay model with four time periods, none of the time 
periods are significant.  In the subsample, preshort and post short differ from prelong.  
Neither of these comparisons were outlined in the hypotheses.  In the subsample, no time 
periods were significant which is inconsistent with the original specification. 
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In the log of total charges model for the short term full sample, teaching hospital 
status, co-morbidity burden, and Medicare as payer were significant and the short term 
subsample was generally consistent.  Using the four time periods model, no time periods 
showed a significant result.  This is also true in the subsample.  This is inconsistent with the 
long term results in the original specification but broadly consistent with the hypostheses that 
there would be differences in cost in the short run, that would dissipate in the long run. 
 
Implications and Future Directions 
 
These results suggest that there are differences in outcomes between the short and 
long term after an NCD for DBS.  In the DBS field, replication of this result would 
strengthen its relevance. Because many demonstration projects are 2 years or fewer in length, 
implications for policy research are, that policymakers may need to interpret results of a 
benefit expansions carefully because there can be short term changes in outcomes that are 
temporary. On the other hand, long term, prospsective studies for the consequences of a 
benefit change could be cost prohibitive and impractical.  Future policy research could 
contribute to the literature by exploring this conundrum and identifying ways to account for 
the risk of decision error based on misleading short term results. 
 
Limitations 
 
As with any inquiry, frequently more questions arise than those answered. Based 
upon the data presented, it does appear that patients meeting eligibility criteria did obtain the 
DBS and that outcomes improved over the long term, with fewer complication rates and 
shorter lengths of stay. Charges, as a surrogate marker of costs, also increased over time even 
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though all costs were normalized to 2003 US dollars. Given these findings, expansion of 
funding for the evaluated services have improved patient outcomes over the longer term time 
period.  In the short term, however, outcomes worsened. 
There are some limitations with the data and the study.  The data does not have a 
variable for disease-specific severity; instead, a measure for overall disease co-morbidity was 
used.  The NIS HCUP data includes inpatient stays, and this is the unit of study; however, 
patients cannot be followed over time after their hospital discharge.  Additionally, the data 
does not include laboratory values.  Further, to support privacy of patients, CMS requires that 
no cell in a table reveal fewer than 10 observations so that there is no chance that patients can 
be identified.  Therefore, any variable that has a cell with fewer than 10 observations will be 
redacted.  Finally, the way the data is sampled may contribute to multicollinearity in the 
sample.  In other words, the sampling method may insert correlations between explanatory 
variables that are not present in the entire population (Kmenta, 2003/2004). 
As with all investigations, limitations exist in the existing work and are duly noted. 
First, the assessment was completed using retrospective data collected for other purposes. 
While it would have been ideal to have more specific physician data, access to this variable 
was not available for all records. Cost data was also limited in that it was charge data and the 
true cost of care are frequently less than charges. The exact overstatement in cost estimates in 
this evaluation is unknown.  Geographical variations were observed but the data precluded a 
more through investigation of these variations and their implications for funding DBS in the 
alterative regions of the United States.  
While the limitations are real, and so noted, the dataset can provided information 
about DBS inpatient clinical and economic outcomes as well as indications of benefit 
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expansion policy success.  The results of this study suggest that after the DBS benefit 
expansion, outcomes worsened in the short term, and improved in the long term.  
Policymakers may benefit from a longer term view when forecasting outcomes after a benefit 
design change—or interpreting short term results.  Differences in populations served may 
cause temporary or long term shifts in health outcomes and resource utilization. This study 
shows that in the long term, the PD NCD does appear to improve patient care for those 
individuals suffering from PD. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is challenged each year with 
increasing beneficiary access to health care while working within multiple budget 
constraints. One mechanism for CMS to ensure patients receive care that is evidence based is 
through the National Coverage Decision (NCD) process.  
 One type of coverage decision that was implemented in 2003 was coverage for a 
procedure known as Deep Brain Stimulation in eligible candidates with Parkinson‘s Disease 
(PD). To ensure standardization in implementation of this expanded benefit, CMS issued 
guidance on types of patients who are eligible to receive their procedure based upon the 
patient clinical characteristics.  
These issues are important to examining whether health policy goals have been met 
because failing to recognize these complexities could lead to an incorrect assessment of the 
success or failure of the benefit expansion. In particular, surgically implantable devices in 
chronic, progressive disease states pose special problems that must be addressed. Failure to 
recognize and account for these issues can lead to incorrect conclusions in program 
assessment. 
As discussed throughout this document, if a policy-maker were to only look at the 
initial expenses and outcomes of DBS surgery for Parkinson‘s disease, a grim picture of 
poorer outcomes and higher expenses might be observed. But this may be temporary. Over 
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time, the effects of sicker patients and inexperienced facilities or surgeons diminishes and the 
more accurate effect of the policy on inpatient outcomes would be revealed. 
 The purpose of the above evaluation was to assess changes in economic and clinical 
outcomes for patient undergoing the procedure before an after the implementation of the 
NCD in 2003. The outcome from the evaluation is designed to inform policy makers as to 
both the short run and long run outcomes of the NDC. To date, this analysis is not currently 
reported in the literature. Therefore, the efforts of this evaluation address an important gap 
and the understanding of key stakeholders about the outcomes of this benefit expansion.  
The short and long term subsamples, where the important volume variable number of 
procedures per physician was available, revealed differences between short and long term 
outcomes. 
The short and long term full sample, where physician volume was not available for all 
records, showed few differences due to the time surgery was delivered.  This may be due to 
the lack of the important volume variable for the number of procedures per physician.  The 
alternate specification using hierarchical models had consistencies with the short and long 
term subsample results; but could not accommodate two classes in the subsample analysis 
(hospital and physician) due to sample size restrictions.  
The short run subsample reveals that having the procedure in the 12 months after the 
DBS benefit expansion is associated with discharges to long term or short term care rather 
than home; is positively associated with longer lengths of stay; and positively associated with 
the log of total charges.  Having the surgery in the short run post period is not associated with 
complications. The long run subsample reveals that having the procedure over 12 months 
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after the benefit expansion is associated with lower complications, negatively associated with 
length of stay, and positively associated with log of total charges. 
In general, these results suggest that after the DBS benefit expansion, outcomes 
worsened in the short term, and improved in the long term, except for total charges.  
Policymakers may benefit from a longer term view when forecasting outcomes after a benefit 
design change—or interpreting short term results.  Differences in populations served may 
cause temporary or long term shifts in health outcomes and healthcare resource utilization.   
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Appendix A 
Data Dictionary 
 
VARIABLE  
NAME 
VARIABLE 
DESCRIPTION 
HCUP 
DATABASE 
KEY HCUP Record (unique identifier for each 
hospitalization) 
ALL 
HOSPID Hospital ID number (unique identifier for each 
hospital) 
ALL 
COHORT IDENTIFICATION 
PD Diagnosed with Parkinson‘s Disease (based upon 
receipt of ICD-9 code of 332.xx in fields DX1-DX15) 
CORE 
DBS Receipt of Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) (based 
upon procedure codes – PR1-PR15 (ICD-9 
procedures). See Appendix for codes for this variable 
CORE 
AMONTH Month of admission (1-12) CORE 
YEAR Year of admission (Note – this variable is not in any 
database BUT all data is collected by year) 
CORE 
PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS 
AGE Patient age (in years) at time of hospitalization CORE 
FEMALE 1 if patient is female CORE 
PARK Diagnosed with Parkinson‘s Disease  
INCOME Median household income (based upon zipcode – 
found by variable ZIPINC_QRTL for years 2003-
2006 and variable ZIPINC for years 1998 – 2002) 
CORE 
RACE Patient race (1-white; 2-black; 3-Hispanic; 4-Asian or 
Pacific Islander; 5 Native American; 6-Other 
CORE 
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ASIAN If race=Asian then asian =True  
WHITE If race=White then white=True  
BLACK If race=Black then Black =True  
HISPANIC If race=Hispanic then Hispanic = True  
NATAM If race=natam then natam=True  
OTHRACE If race=Othrace then Othrace = True  
PAY1 Primary payer (1-Medicare; 2-Medicaid; 3-Private 
including HMO; 4-Self-pay; 5-No charge; 6 other) 
based upon variable PAY1 
CORE 
MEDICARE PAY1=1 then MEDICARE = True  
MEDICAID PAY1=2  
PRIVINS PAY1=3  
SELFINS PAY1=4  
FREEINS PAY1=5  
OTHERINS PAY1=6  
MEDREIMB If time period of medicare reimbursement is after 
benefit expansion, or from April 1, 2003 onwarad, 
MEDREIMB=1 
 
ATYPE Admission Type – (1-Emergency; 2-Urgent; 3-
Elective; 4-Newborn; 5-Trauma Center Beginning in 
2003 data; 6-Other) based upon variable ATYPE 
CORE 
ASOURCE Admission Source (1-ER; 2-Another hospital; 3-
Another facility including long-term care; 4-
Court/law enforcement; 5-Routine/birth/other) from 
variable ASOURCE 
CORE 
INC Household income based on zipcode of patient 
residence: see approach to smooth categories over 
years in database 
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INCOME Income Categorization  
OUTCOMES 
TTREND Time Trend by Month from 1/1/99 through 12/31/07  
LOS Hospital LOS  CORE 
DIED 1 if died during hospitalization  CORE 
TOTCHG Total charges (edited) CORE 
DISP Disposition of patient (1-Routine; 2-Short-term 
hospital; 3-Skilled nursing facility; 4-Intermediate 
care facility; 5-Another type of facility; 6-Home 
health care; 7-Against medical advice; 20-Died) 
CORE 
DISPUNIFORM If DISP=1 or 6 then DISPUNIFORM=HOME; If 
DISP=2 or 3 or 4 or 5 then 
DISPUNIFORM=ANOTHER HEALTH CARE 
FACILITY; If DISP=20 then 
DISPUNIFORM=DIED. 
 
SHRTRUN 1 year pre and post medicare reimbursement benefit 
change 
 
LONG RUN   
HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS 
HBEDSIZE # Beds in hospital HOSPITAL 
BEDS Hospital bedsize (1-small; 2-medium; 3-large) based 
upon variable HOSP_BEDSIZE 
 
BEDLG If BEDS = 3 then Bedlg=True  
BEDMED If BEDS=2 then Bedmed=True  
BEDSM If BEDS=1 then Bedsm=True  
URBAN Hospital location (0-rural; 1-urban) based upon 
variable HOSP_LOCATION 
HOSPITAL 
RURAL If Urban = 0 then Rural = True and hospital in rural  
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region 
HURBRU Hospital urban or rural  
HTEACH Teaching status of hospital (0 – non-teaching; 1 
teaching) based upon variable HOSP_TEACH 
HOSPITAL 
HCNTRL Control/ownership of hospital (0-government or 
prive; collapsed category; 1-government, nonfederal 
public; 2-private, non-profit voluntary, 3-private 
invest-own; 4-private, collapsed category), based 
upon variable HOSP_CONTROL 
HOSPITAL 
HOSPST State hospital is located in– can be rolled up to 
geographic regions 
HOSPITAL 
HREGION Region of Hospital  
MIDWEST Hospital in Midwest (list?)  
NEAST Hospital in Northeast (list?)  
WEST Hospital in West (list?)  
SOUTH Hospital in South (list?)  
HDISCH # Discharges from this hospital  
COMORBIDITIES / PATIENT SEVERITY 
AHRQSUM Sum of 28 AHRQ comorbidities – see Appendix B 
(calculated using variables DX1-DX15) 
CORE 
APRDRG All Patient Refined DRG score  SEVERITY 
APRDRGM APR-DRG Risk of Mortality Score (based upon 
variable APRDRG_Risk_Mortality) 
SEVERITY 
APRDRGS APR-DRG severity of illness subclass (based upon 
variable APRDRG_Severity) 
SEVERITY 
CHLSON Deyo-Charlson Comorbidity Score SEVERITY 
SARRAY Receipt of Single Array Neurostimulator Pulse  
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Generator 
DARRAY Receipt of Double Array Neurostimulator Pulse 
Generator 
 
COMPLICATIONS 
INF Post-surgical infarction or hemorrhage (ICD-9-CM 
Diagnosis codes of 997.00-997.09) 
CORE 
HEM Hematoma complicating a procedure (ICD-9-CM 
diagnosis codes of 998.1-998.13) 
CORE 
MECH 
NDCOMP 
Mechanical complications related to a neurological 
device (996.2) 
CORE 
INFND ICND 
NDCOMP 
Infectious complications related to a neurological 
device (996.63) 
CORE 
REM 
REMND 
Removal of a previously implanted neurological 
device (01.22) 
CORE 
ANYCOMP If INF or HEM or MECH or INFND or REM =1 then 
ANYCOMP = TRUE  
 
NEUR Neurological complications (true false)  
PRDAY1 # of days from admission to primary procedure  
PHYSICIAN SPECIFIC VOLUME AND HOSPITAL VOLUME 
PPERFAC Percentage of all facilities that provide DBS in the 
―pre-period‖ 
 
PPERDR Percentage of all doctors that provide DBS in the 
―pre-period‖ 
 
PPERINPT Percentage of all inpatient admissions that are DBS in 
the ―pre-period‖ 
 
PDBSHOSP Number of DBS procedures performed per hospital in 
the ―pre-period‖ 
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PERFAC Percentage of all facilities that provide DBS in the 
―post-period‖ 
 
PERDR Percentage of all doctors that provide DBS in the 
―post-period‖ 
 
PERINPT Percentage of all inpatient admissions that are DBS in 
the ―post-period‖ 
 
PDBSHOSP Number of DBS procedures performed per hospital in 
the ―post-period‖ 
 
PHYSID Physician ID  
NUMDOC Number of deep brain stimulations performed at 
physician level 
 
HNUMDB Number of deep brain stimulations performed at 
hospital level 
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Appendix B 
 
Complications – Long Run Without Physician Variable 
 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
AGE 0.984 0.965—1.003     0.1032 
FEMALE 1.434 1.002—2.052     0.0486* 
INCOME <$44,999 0.933 0.640—1.358     0.7166 
MEDICAID 1.764   0.648—4.797     0.2664 
MEDICARE 1.088 0.709—1.672     0.6986 
ERTYPE 2.162 0.963—4.856     0.0617 
CHARLSON 1.643 1.255—2.150     0.0003* 
MIDWEST 0.486 0.268—0.884     0.0181* 
SOUTH 0.807 0.524—1.242     0.3294 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 1.246 0.653—2.376     0.5046 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 2.144 1.068—4.303     0.0319* 
# TOTAL HOSP DISCH. 1.000 1.000—1.000     0.0912 
#DBS PROC IN HOSP 1.002 0.998—1.005     0.3383 
MEDREIMB 0.577 0.393—0.846     0.0048* 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix C 
 
Complications – Long Run with Physician Influence 
 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
AGE 0.980 0.955—1.006     0.1346 
FEMALE 1.579 0.956—2.607     0.0745 
INCOME <$44,999 0.773 0.456—1.312     0.3403 
MEDICAID 2.533 0.644—9.964     0.1837 
MEDICARE 1.854 0.975—3.524     0.0596 
ERTYPE 2.135 0.541—8.424     0.2787 
CHARLSON 1.873 1.299—2.702     0.0008* 
MIDWEST 0.423 0.186—0.966     0.0411* 
SOUTH 0.388 0.196—0.766     0.0064* 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 0.872 0.367—2.072     0.7562 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 0.728 0.575—5.191     0.3299 
# TOTAL HOSP DISCH. 1.000 1.000—1.000     0.0695 
#DBS PROC IN HOSP 0.999 0.988—1.011     0.9250 
NUMDOC 0.988 0.971—1.005     0.1570 
MEDREIMB 0.376 0.218—0.649     0.0004* 
    
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix D 
 
Non Death Disposition - Long Run Full Sample 
 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
AGE 1.041 1.021—1.062 <0.001* 
FEMALE 1.388 1.015--1.897    0.0401* 
INCOME < $44,999 0.723 0.519--1.005    0.0537 
MEDICAID 4.776 1.9261—1.843    0.0007* 
MEDICARE 1.638 1.050--2.555    0.0296* 
CHARLSON 1.472 1.158--1.871    0.0016* 
ANYCOMP 3.425 2.136--5.490 <0.0001* 
MIDWEST 1.380 0.729--2.612    0.3224 
WEST 0.898 0.495--1.629    0.7262 
SOUTH 1.157 0.627--2.135    0.6406 
TEACHING HOSP 1.438 0.850--2.435    0.1758 
BEDSIZE SMALL 0.239 0.069--0.834    0.0248* 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 0.895 0.478—1.677    0.7295 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP 1.000 1.000—1.000    0.1712 
# DBS / HOSP 0.999 0.995—1.002    0.3621 
MEDREIMB 0.885 0.629—1.245    0.4813 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix E 
 
Non Death Disposition – Long Run with Physician Influence 
 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
AGE 1.055 1.023—1.088 0.0007 
FEMALE 1.662 1.037—2.663 0.0347 
INCOME < $44,999 0.674 0.408—1.113 0.1231 
MEDICAID 6.186 1.744—21.937 0.0048* 
MEDICARE 0.961 0.496—1.861 0.9050 
CHARLSON 1.408 0.978—2.026 0.0656 
ANYCOMP 4.955 2.580—9.517 <0.0001* 
MIDWEST 1.530 0.607—3.859 0.3671 
WEST 1.442 0.628—3.313 0.3882 
SOUTH 1.184 0.504—2.783 0.6981 
TEACHING HOSP 1.801 0.846—3.835 0.1269 
BEDSIZE SMALL <0.001 <0.001-- >999.999 0.9746 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 0.310 0.101—0.947 0.0398* 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP 1.000 1.000—1.000 0.0451* 
# DBS / HOSP 1.000 0.990—1.011 0.9408 
# DBS / MD 0.990 0.974—1.006 0.2198 
MEDREIMB 1.041 0.613—1.769 0.8808 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix F 
 
Length of Stay–Long Run without Physician Influence 
 
 
Variable PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
Chi Square P-Value 
INTERCEPT 0.1635 1.13 0.2884 
AGE 0.0123 33.55 <0.0001* 
FEMALE 0.0828 4.79 0.0287* 
INCOME < $44,999 -0.0650 2.90 0.0884 
MEDICAID 0.2014 8 0.1153 
MEDICARE -0.0707 2.51 0.1132 
ER TYPE -0.1139 1.46 0.2271 
CHARLSON 0.0486 2.15 0.1430 
ANY COMPLICATIONS 0.7879 145.09 <0.0001* 
MIDWEST -0.1404 3.85 0.0499* 
WEST -0.3137 23.35 <0.0001* 
SOUTH -0.1635 5.83 0.0158* 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 0.3226 25.66 <0.0001* 
BEDSIZE SMALL -0.4296 15.02 0.0001* 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM -0.1664 4.22 0.0399* 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP -0.0000 11.92 0.0006* 
# DBS PER HOSP 0.0008 4.39 0.0361* 
MEDREIMB -0.1306 10.73 0.0011* 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix G 
 
Length of Stay–Long Run with Physician Influence 
 
 
Variable 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
Chi Square P-Value 
INTERCEPT 0.1767 0.64 0.4242 
AGE 0.0156 24.88 <0.0001* 
FEMALE 0.0467 0.70 0.4035 
INCOME < $44,999 -0.0110 0.04 0.4035 
MEDICAID -0.0992 0.25 0.8435 
MEDICARE -0.1161 2.96 0.6178 
ER TYPE 0.4727 5.54 0.0853 
CHARLSON 0.0940 3.88 0.0186* 
ANY COMPLICATIONS 0.9358 107.71 0.0488* 
MIDWEST -0.1339 1.74 <0.0001* 
WEST -0.3730 17.63 0.1877 
SOUTH -0.2576 8.37 <0.0001* 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 0.3389 14.44 0.0038* 
BEDSIZE SMALL -0.5111 11.37 0.0001* 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM -0.2172 3.36 0.0007* 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP -0.000 13.15 0.0667* 
# DBS PER HOSP -0.0035 7.30 0.0003* 
#DBS per MD 0.0053 6.76 0.0069* 
MEDREIMB -0.2857 22.17 0.0093* 
    
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix H 
 
Log Total Charges –Long Run Full Sample 
 
 
Variable 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
t-Statistic P-Value 
INTERCEPT 10.17789 89.51 <0.001 
AGE 0.00006551 0.04 0.9668 
FEMALE -0.05399 -1.87 0.0611 
INCOME < $44,999 -0.01540 -0.54 0.5905 
MEDICAID -0.00316 -0.03 0.9744 
MEDICARE -0.02312 -0.69 0.4909 
ER SOURCE 0.47813 02.75 0.0060* 
ER TYPE -0.19476 2.50 0.0126* 
CHARLSON 0.00567 0.22 0.8279 
ANY COMPLICATIONS -0.07646 -1.30 0.1927 
MIDWEST -0.6909 -1.269 0.2062 
WEST 0.27152 5.47 <0.001* 
SOUTH -0.00991 -0.19 0.8459 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 0.28078 6.34 <0.001* 
BEDSIZE SMALL -0.32483 -4.13 <0.001* 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM -0.01775 -0.30 0.7619 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP -0.00000112 -0.92 0.3595 
# DBS PER HOSP -0.00049607 -1.81 0.0708 
MEDREIMB 0.33875 11.15 <0.001* 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix I 
 
Log Total Charge – Long Run Subsample 
 
 
Variable 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
t-Statistic P-Value 
INTERCEPT 10.16751 57.14 <0.001 
AGE -0.00186 -0.74 0.4591 
FEMALE -0.00610 -0.13 0.8934 
INCOME < $44,999 -0.03294 -0.73 0.4653 
MEDICAID -0.09481 -0.62 0.5335 
MEDICARE -0.03420 -0.63 0.5305 
ER SOURCE 0.32164 1.16 0.2459 
ER TYPE 0.00193 0.01 0.9932 
CHARLSON 0.05412 1.31 0.1889 
ANY COMPLICATIONS -0.05950 -0.67 0.5043 
MIDWEST -0.03047 -0.35 0.7267 
WEST 0.20299 2.73 0.0065* 
SOUTH 0.07260 0.99 0.3221 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 0.32670 4.71 <0.0001* 
BEDSIZE SMALL -0.32641 -2.78 0.0055* 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM -0.24186 -2.55 0.0109* 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP -0.00000511 -2.90 0.0038* 
# DBS PER HOSP 0.00180 1.82 0.0690 
#DBS per MD 0.00197 1.23 0.2201 
MEDREIMB 0.41463 8.48 <0.001* 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix J 
 
Complications – Short Run Full Sample 
 
Hierarchical Logistic Multivariate Model 
 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
AGE 1.014 0.979—1.050 0.4432 
FEMALE 1.038 0.567—1.893 0.9033 
INCOME < $45,000 0.801 0.424—1.513 0.4935 
MEDICAID 4.670 0.864—25.226 0.0733 
MEDICARE 1.237 0.588—2.605 0.5746 
ERSOURCE 0.225 0.004—11.505 0.4572 
ERTYPE 10.838 0.543—216.473 0.1186 
CHARLSON 1.709 1.074—2.719 0.0238* 
MIDWEST 0.146 0.034—0.617 0.0090* 
SOUTH 0.269 0.070—1.032 0.0556* 
WEST 0.348 0.094—1.285 0.1133 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 1.026 0.355—2.963 0.9627 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 0.854 0.094—7.791 0.8889 
# DBS PER HOSP 1.009 1.002—1.015 0.0124* 
TOTAL 
DISCHARGES/HOSP 
 
1.000 
 
1.000—1.000 
 
0.4470 
MEDREIMB 1.051 0.578—0.2581 0.8709 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix K 
 
Complications - Short Run Subsample 
 
Hierarchical Logistic Multivariate Model  
 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
AGE 0.973 0.907 0.4529 
FEMALE 2.405 0.782 0.1256 
INCOME < $44,999 1.135 0.366 0.8259 
MEDICAID 7.775 0.949 0.0559 
MEDICARE 1.287 0.303 0.7319 
ERSOURCE <0.001 . 0.9996 
ERTYPE  >999.999 . 0.9997 
CHARLSON 0.769 0.199 0.7033 
MIDWEST 0.152 0.023 0.0503 
SOUTH 0.243 0.041 0.1174 
WEST <0.001 . 0.9992 
NUMDOC 0.995 0.952 0.8288 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 0.797 0.059 0.8638 
BED MEDIUM 2.765 0.177 0.4674 
#DBS PER HOSP 0.970 0.946 0.0181* 
TOTAL 
DISCHARGES/HOSP 
1.000 1.000 0.0197 
MEDREIMB 0.557 0.138 0.4105 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix L 
 
Non Death Disposition – Short Run Full Sample 
 
Hierarchical Logistic Multivariate Model 
 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
AGE 1.035 1.002—1.070 0.0362* 
FEMALE 0.827 0.485—1.413 0.4871 
INCOME < $44,999 0.632 0.361—1.105 0.1071 
MEDICAID 21.751 5.118—92.444 <0.0001* 
MEDICARE 3.634 1.570—8.411 0.0026* 
ERSOURCE >999.999 . 0.9997 
ERTYPE <0.001 . 0.9997 
CHARLSON 1.587 1.057—2.383 0.0259* 
MIDWEST 0.409 0.129—1.299 0.1292 
SOUTH 0.331 0.090—1.211 0.0946 
WEST 0.177 0.049—0.642 0.0084* 
ANYCOMP 3.703 1.734—7.908 0.0007* 
HTEACH 1.473 0.516—4.209 0.4691 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 0.851 0.180—4.019 0.8382 
# DBS PER HOSP 1.001 0.994—1.007 0.8693 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP  1.000 1.000—1.000 0.2618 
MEDREIMB 1.287 0.746—2.219 0.3638 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix M 
 
Non Death Disposition – Short Run Subsample 
 
Hierarchical Logistic Multivariate Model 
 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval P-Value 
AGE 1.022 0.969—1.078 .4187 
FEMALE 1.356 0.603—3.049 .4612 
INCOME < $44,999 0.925 0.400—2.139 .8545 
MEDICAID 83.872 12.123—580.268 <0.001* 
MEDICARE 4.496 1.163—17.378 0.0294* 
ERSOURCE >999.999 . 0.9998 
ERTYPE <0.001 . 0.9998 
CHARLSON 0.801 0.342—1.879 0.6096 
MIDWEST 0.942 0.247—3.591 0.9296 
SOUTH 0.058 0.009—0.359 0.0023* 
WEST 0.091 0.006—1.380 0.0838 
ANYCOMP 1.064 0.166—6.818 0.9479 
TEACHING HOSP 0.385 0.083—1.784 0.2220 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM 1.959 0.309—12.418 0.4744 
# DBS PER HOSP 0.987 0.968—1.006 0.1773 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP 1.000 1.000—1.000 0.0672 
NUMDOC  1.058 1.020—1.097 0.0029* 
MEDREIMB 4.474 1.385—14.454 0.0124* 
    
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix N 
 
Length of Stay – Short Run Full Sample 
 
Hierarchical Negative Binomial Multivariate Model 
 
 
Variable Estimate t Value P-Value 
INTERCEPT 0.1561 0.32 0.7538 
AGE 0.006669 1.75 0.0797 
FEMALE -0.01455 -0.22 0.8232 
INCOME < $44,999 -0.1128 -1.68 0.0930 
MEDICAID 0.09794 0.43 0.6652 
MEDICARE 0.2136 2.68 0.0075* 
ERSOURCE 0.8763 0.97 0.3343 
ERTYPE -1.1523 -1.54 0.1234 
CHARLSON 0.1452 2.50 0.0125* 
MIDWEST -0.1605 -0.47 0.6402 
SOUTH 0.01047 0.29 0.7754 
WEST -0.06547 -0.19 0.8487 
ANYCOMP 0.8537 7.65 <0.0001* 
HTEACH 0.1836 0.60 0.5490 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM  -0.3542 -0.99 0.3206 
#DBS PER HOSP 0.000181 0.08 0.9346 
TOTAL 
DISCHARGES 
-0.00000257 -0.31 0.7574 
MEDREIMB 0.03760 0.54 0.5914 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix O 
 
Length of Stay – Short Run Subsample 
 
Hierarchical Negative Binomial Multivariate Model 
 
 
Variable Estimate t Value P-Value 
INTERCEPT 1.0567 1.96 0.0643 
AGE -0.00092 -0.17 0.8665 
FEMALE 0.1171 1.33 0.1838 
INCOME < $44,999 -0.00418 -0.05 0.9626 
MEDICAID 0.3607 1.53 0.1272 
MEDICARE 0.3545 3.17 0.0016* 
ERSOURCE 1.5013 1.42 0.1570 
ERTYPE -0.9402 -1.03 0.3015 
CHARLSON 0.06180 0.71 0.4780 
MIDWEST -0.272 -0.97 0.3302 
SOUTH  -0.5490 -1.73 0.0838 
WEST -0.7720 -1.81 0.0716 
ANYCOMP 0.2320 1.07 0.2869 
TEACHING HOSPITAL  -0.1555 -0.54 0.5910 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM  0.06088 0.19 0.8489 
# DBS PER HOSP  -0.00031 -0.09 0.9301 
TOTAL HOSP DISCH  -0.00001 -1.35 0.1787 
NUMDOC 0.008131 1.86 0.0639 
MEDREIMB 0.2343 2.10 0.0359* 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix P 
 
Log Total Charges – Short Run Full Sample 
 
Hierarchical Ordinary Least Squares Multivariate Model 
 
 
Variable 
PARAMETER 
ESTIMATE 
t-Statistic P-Value 
INTERCEPT 9.8759 22.86 <0.0001 
AGE -0.00362 -1.70 030894 
FEMALE -0.00517 -0.14 0.8899 
INCOME < $44,999 -0.01857 -0.50 0.6194 
MEDICAID 0.3277 2.63 0.0086* 
MEDICARE 0.07215 1.66 0.0981 
ER SOURCE 1.0463 2.20 0.0284* 
ER TYPE -0.8440 -2.26 0.0185* 
CHARLSON 0.1055 2.85 0.0045* 
MIDWEST 0.2970 0.89 0.3748 
SOUTH  0.1734 0.48 0.6328 
WEST 0.7271 2.14 0.0329* 
ANYCOMP 0.08349 1.13 0.2568 
TEACHING HOSPITAL 0.7211 2.47 0.0137* 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM -0.2662 -0.84 0.3998 
# DBS PER HOSP  0.000306 0.13 0.8953 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP -0.00000495 -0.63 0.5274 
MEDREIMB 0.02395 0.60 0.5499 
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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Appendix Q 
 
Log Total Charges – Short Run Subsample 
 
Hierarchical Ordinary Least Squares Multivariate Model 
 
 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
t-Statistic P-Value 
INTERCEPT 9.6287 14.28 <0.0001 
AGE -0.00556 -1.60 0.1097 
FEMALE 0.008671 0.15 0.8800 
INCOME < $44,999 0.05510 0.98 0.3295 
MEDICAID 0.3711 2.37 0.0182* 
MEDICARE 0.05250 0.76 0.4486 
ER SOURCE 2.7438 3.56 0.0004* 
ER TYPE -2.0954 -3.56 0.0004* 
CHARLSON 0.1030 1.80 0.0719 
MIDWEST 0.3865 0.78 0.4349 
SOUTH  0.3000 0.59 0.5571 
WEST 0.8569 1.41 0.1595 
ANYCOMP 1.0596 0.53 0.5951 
TEACHING HOSPITAL  0.08173 2.35 0.0192* 
BEDSIZE MEDIUM  1.0596 -0.54 0.5867 
# DBS PER HOSP  0.001785 0.33 0.7451 
TOTAL DISCH / HOSP  -0.00001 -1.08 0.2795 
# DBS PER PHYSICIAN  0.004301 1.38 0.1691 
MEDREIMB  0.05297 0.73 0.4666 
    
* denotes statistically significant findings (P < 0.05) 
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